National Reconciliation in Sudan

Sun, 15 Apr 2018



 

Dr. HāshimBābiker Mohamed Ahmed

Abstract:

Colonel Gaa'farNimairy seized power in Sudan after a military coup in the 25th of may 1969. The Free Officers showed their intentions to follow the socialway and finding a solution to the problem of the south, and the council of the revolution leadership made some changes such as changing the name of the country to The Democratic Republic of Sudan.

With May 1969 coup the second democracy page was folded, political parties were outlawed and the arrest of the head of the sovereignty council IsmaÌ'l al Azhari together with al SayidKhi¼iramad, as well as the arrest of the ministers of the previous government except the prime minister Mohammad Ahmed MaÊjŪb who the coup government decided to keep in his house in the beginning and then encouraged him to immigrate to the UK.

The right wing parties decided to resist the coup of May 1969

And that started when al Ansār from the beginning decided to resist Nimairi and they started to lay an eye on him, and then quickly started to prepare themselves for the resistance and called on each other secretly for Jihad, so they gathered in Abba Island the birth place of the Mahdist revolution in the year 1881.

Al îādiq al Mahdi the prime minister of  the period (1966-1967) was one of the most prominent enemies of Nimair coup, and he argued that Nimairi disrupted the constitution and disabled democracy, arrested the political leaders and at the same time allied with the communists.

The Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of Mohamed al îādiqalKārŪri and Mohamed îāliÊUmar and the Unionists under the leadership of al SharÌf al Hindi joined the opposition against the regime of Nimairi when they announced the birth of the National Front for the Resistance of The Regime in Abba island in 1969.

 

Prologue

The meeting of Port Sudan between Nimairi and al îādiqal Mahdi on 7/7/1977

The collapse of the reconciliation between presidentNimairi and al îādiq al Mahdi

The other parties stance from the reconciliation

The results of the National Reconciliation 1977

Epilogue

References and Resources

 

Prologue:

The NationalReconciliationrefers to   the consensus reached by all the oppositionparties of the National Front with the regime of May revolution under the leadership of Gaa'farNimairi as a result of the meeting between the leader of The National Front Sayidal îādiqal Mahdi and the president of the regime in Port Sudan on 7/7/1977. Reconciliation is an old term in the theory of the global organization which determines the process of peaceful settlement  of conflicts between countries, and it is usually done through a third party, in the seventies of the twenties century the concept took a national meaning which is finding peaceful solution to conflicts inside the state (1).

assan Kay stated that the first reference to the national reconciliation was mentioned in the memo that was presented by al Tayib Zain alĀ'bdÌn who was under arrest since the coup of lieutenant assanusain in September 1975 in Kobarprison  to the head of state GafarNemeri in July 1976. It was a personal initiative where he mentioned that he doesn’t like the policies of blood shedding and he suggested for presidentNimairi to adopt national reconciliation policies with the National Front , and that this conflict doesn’t have any winner and the biggest looser is Sudan(2).

The announcement of the national reconciliation in 1977 between presidentNimairi and the Sudanese opposition represented by the parties of the National Front after the government received several painful hits from the opposition under the leadership of al îādiq al Mahdy the head of the National Umma Party and al Ansar, as well as al SharÌf al Hindi the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party the division that opposes the regime of May, and Dr. assan al Turāby the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood (3)

These painful hits were represented by the last three events that started with colonel Abd al RaÊÌm Shannān coup attempt in Sha'abān 1973, then followed by the coup of the lieutenant assanussain in September 1975 and last the events of the 2ed of July 1976 which was the end of the road for the opposition because it drained its powers and afterwards it was clear for the National Front the hardness of continuing in such attempts that was aimed to overthrow the regime*.

The government after the attempt of July 1976 felt exhausted by the consecutive armed conflicts, as well as that it needed a formula aimed at reconciliation with the National Front each party on its own, so it took the way of indirect negotiation through the mediation of the mediators until these efforts culminated in the National Reconciliation in 1977.

Each of al îādiqal  Mahdi, al SharÌf al Hind and Hassan al Turāby was  looking for a better situation than the previously mentioned, they had enough of the armed struggle and the work from the outside and they saw that the armed struggle has no benefit so they decided that it’s better to reconcile with the regime so they can get back to Sudan at least and then search for ways to participate in the making of the decisions with the existence of warranties and conditions(1)The regime of Nimairi was in dire need for political stability after the events of 1976, and the attempt to seize power through outside armed invasion added to the fears of Nimairi so he feared that that attempt would happen again stronger and with bigger outside help so he had to close that door through comprehensive national reconciliation. Nimairi thought that through his reconciliation with the opposition he will not lose anything as long as his reign will continue in addition to that this direction will support and strengthen him(1).

The reasons behind the national reconciliation:

1. The armed conflict drained the military powers of the National Front, and it was not possible to repeat a military operation that resembles the operation of July 1976.

2. The National Front feared the possibilities of outside hegemony with the establishment of a communist regime in Ethiopia and the direction of Libya towards the SovietUnion.

3. The weakness of May regime after the hard hits that it received after the appearance of the power of the National Front popularly in Sha'bān and its military powers after September 1975 and July 1976 so the regime became willing to negotiate and to widen the participation of the opposition and allow freedoms, as well as the change in May regime’s political ideology to a close to Islamic ideology(2).

For these reasons there was no way for the two parties but to accept the  principle of negotiation, Fathal RaÊmānElbashÌr, Umar al Tayib  and MamŪnA'wad Abu Zaid played important roles as mediators (3). Nimairi resorted to reconcile with every faction of the national front alone, Umma party under the leadership of al îādigal Mahdi started by making a political deal that is aimed to share power with Nimairi, and before the expected meeting between Nimairi and alîādigal Mahdi, al îādig suggested to Fathal RaÊmānElbashÌr* ten political points that the dialogue should revolve around, and they are as follows:-

1- Toagree on closing the doorpermanentlybefore the dividing ofthe country into parties and the acceptance of a national party that is built upon the participation of nationwidemulti factionpopular organizations. This party would be formed and its mechanism of action would be decided in upcoming meetings(1)..

2- Thecurrent constitution in its basic principles is accepted, but some of its articles requirerevision and Amendment, this to be carried out by the Legislative body (the parliament).

3- The armed forces are an important part of the political operation and performance and on its shoulders falls the responsibility of protecting the nation’s gains while remaining committed to military regulations and soldierly discipline.

4- The agreement of Addis Ababa in 1972 achieved its goals and it’s accepted by everyone, thus, it has to be developed for the benefit of Sudan north and south and to close the doorbefore foreignintervention(2).

5- The continuation of development efforts is a main goal of the government, but this development has to be planned and fairly assigned to classes and provinces of the country with special care of the more disadvantaged regions.

6- Presidential republic is the proper optionto govern Sudan.

7- Islam is the intellectual logic of performance (private and public).

8- The social system is the best way for sufficiency, justice and economical and social development.

9- Sudan has an Arabian role and African solidarity and hence the Islamic ideals and the African Arabian revival should be protected from the intervention and the control of other countries.

10- Thepresident works through institutions and others to lower the intensity of grievances and to calm the public atmosphere which was behind the political conflicts. He also should announce general amnesty.

The meeting of Port Sudan between Nimairi and al îādiq al Mahdi 7/7/1977:-

Al Sādiqtraveled to PortSudan to meet president Nemery without consulting any of the leaders of the National Front, and that was in 7/7/1977. Al îādiqAlmahdi stated the reasons that made him respond to the National Reconciliation (1)and they are:

1- The conditions that led the opposition leave Sudan have changed, the events of June 1976 made our existence inside other countries a burden on their national security, and also allowed them to intervene in our affairs as a price for receiving and supporting us.

2- It was clear that the Sudanese social constituents suffered from various weakness points, and the enemies of Sudan could seize the opportunity of internal conflict to work on separating the south, and they might also exploitthe organized provincial factions “NŪbaMountains” to have adopt separatist intentions.

We have realized that Sudan will not catch up with timeunless it went through the road of development which is our way to social justice so all the Sudanese people could enjoy the blessings of their country. In addition to that al îādiq al Mahdiiterate his responding to the National Reconciliation to his discovery through experience and evidence that violence has unsafe consequences, and he believed that al Turābi will participate in Port Sudan meeting, but then Nimairi made it clear that he did not want al Turābi nor the Muslim Brotherhood nor al SharÌf al Hindy nor the Unionists “al Hindi faction”.  He just wantedal îādiqal Mahdyi for his high regardof him;hence this appreciation allowed him to enter the regime1. Also one of the main points that were raised in Port Sudan was the fact thatal îādiq had some remarks on the Social Union and they were as follows:-

1- it’s a party that was created by the regime and drove the people to join it forcibly and with this situation it does not work for the whole Sudan, so it was very necessary to open it up and allow it to be elected freely.

2- the way the Social Union is governing thelaborers and the workers and farmers unions squanders the value of these organizations and empty it from the true democratic competition, and this also applies to press which the Social Union killed, also the Social Union considers that the Sudanese goodness was born in the 25th of May 1969 and this is not true because Sudan has its great revolutions and its national movements that should not be forgotten2.

3- The Social Union has employed the services of security agencies so it became a weapon against the citizens and its people exploited their political positions and manipulated the purveyance and profited at the cost of others, and this is not the business of a political party.

Among the points that were raised in Port Sudan meeting was the Ethiopian and the Eritrean relations with the National Front so Nimairiattacked Ethiopia saying: its falling apart and Karan fell in the hands of the Eritrean revolution, and regarding Libya he did not want to respond to what happened in the morning of the 2nd of July 1976 with a similar act in Tripoli. Al îādiq objected to this point saying that Libya was not responsible for what happened in July 1976, the National Front takes all responsibility, Libya only helped with money, weapons and training, but the men, planning and leadership was purely Sudanese1, at the end of that meeting there was  talk about the situation of al Ansār and the harm that happened to them  so it was required to repay them, as well as the revealing of the location of the burial of Imam al Hādi al Mahdi and allowing his family to bury him in a known place.Al îādiq also asked to show respect to the Imam’s oldest son. Nimairi showed positive response to these request because he wanted the reconciliation2.

 

In the next day Al îādiq traveled to London and came back after a week to Khartoum and in 24/7 the National Front held a meeting in London to discuss what al îādiqal Mahdi reached with the regime. He was bitterly rebuked by  the leaders of the Front like UthmānKhālidModawy and al SharÌf al Hindy and afterwards al SharÌf declared his disapproval of the reconciliation 3

Al îādiqwas appointed a member in the political office of the Social Union, so he did the oath and then was sent in many formal missions as a messenger from Nimairi especially to the Arabian gulf countries and some Islamic countries, also appointed with him in the political office was:

Ahmed al Mahdi, Abdel amÌd Sālih, assanal Turābi, Ahmed al Sayid Mohammed Uthmān and Ahmed al Mirghani, also BakriA'dÌl was appointed as a the governor of Kurdufān and YāsÌn Umar al Imām in the parliament, a committee was created to review the laws so they would comply with Islamic SharÌa laws and they established the freedoms redundant especially in the unions work, and they reemployed  the sackedgovernment employees and they were compensated for the period of the discontinuation and thus the reconciliation was fruitful and many were optimists for what it has to offer for the country and the citizens from peace and livelihood1.

The political powers participated in the government due to the declaration of the national reconciliation, where the parties members participated in the various government structures, and the opposition fulfilled its promise to end its training camps in Libya and Ethiopia, where it was finished by the creation of the reconciliation and even those who were reinstated in the service after the reconciliation stayed in their position in Sudan and did not get out afterwards, but soon a conflict arose between Nimairi and al îādiqin spite of the participatingparties members staying in the government formation, of whom was Dr.  Abdul amÌd îāliÊ as a deputy of the head of the parliament and the head of the committee of general inspection, and Dr. SharÌf al Tuhāmi as Energy minister and Ahmed Abd al Rahmān as Interior minister and Bakri AdÌl stayed as governor of Kurdufān 2

The reason for the conflict between the two men was that Nimairi just appointed al îādiq as a member in the political office of the Social Union, and this position was not enough for the political ambitions of al îādiq.Long meetingswere held between îādiq and Nimairi to discuss the high position that he would take, and Nimairi was thinking that îādiq should be :-

A- Deputy of the president for the Provincial Governments.

B- Deputy of the president for economical and financial affairs.

C- Prime minister.

PresidentNimairi consulted many of his close people in giving a high position to îādiqal Mahdy and most of them asked him not to be in a hurry and they assured him that in spite of all his seemingly good qualities and his knowledge and expertise but his allegiance to the revolution was not yet sure, as he was detected having meetings that National Security Agency considered  hostile and un loyal to the revolution which made Nimairi hesitate to announce positioning îādiq in one of the suggested positions, and it seemed that the counselors of Nimairi were afraid of the influence of îādiq al Mahdion account of the statement " the old and the new comers" that was spread and which implied that the new comers would take the power from the old"1).

The collapse of the reconciliation between presidentNimairi and îādiqal Mahdi:

Al îādiq found himself in a position that did not allow him to make decisions, also Nimairi saw that 90% of the power should stay in his hands, that’s why it was the kick offof the downfall of the reconciliation between Nimairi and îādiq al Mahdi who left behind a number of his party leaders in power (2).

Here al îādiq realized that what happened was absurd, and that he would stay in the margin for the regime and afterwards he realized that he couldn't work with the regime, because the regime swerved from the

Lane that it was suppose to follow.  Nimairi worked on making the reconciliation a success with al îādiq to solve part of the problem, and after it was solved he revoked the agreement (the return of the opposition to homeland).

Also one of the reasons why reconciliation between Nimairi and al îādiq failed was related to the signing of the Camp David accord between Egypt and Israel in 17/9/1978.Nimairis approval of this treaty was the last straw, and al îādiq opposed it because he believedit was dangerous to Egypt and Sudan and their relationship with the Arabian nations and the whole Islamic world in general, so Nimairi'ought to get back to the Social Union as a democratic vessel to make a consensus decision about the treaty'.Nimairi’s announcement of supporting the treaty proved two points as îādiqthought:-

First: that the regime of Nimeairiwas under the protection of al Sādāt.

Second: that Nimairi didn’t mean anything when he saidhe would confer with the Social Unionbefore taking any decision. Every major decision he made alone even the decision of the reconciliation itself. So îādiq resigned from the membership of the political office of the Social Union and returned to opposition(1).

The reconciliation with the Muslim Brotherhood: equable

The democratic Unionists (al Hindi faction) and the Muslim Brotherhood blamedîādiq al Mahdi for his negotiations with Nimairi while he insured his safety under his protection, and also that the negotiations should have been commensurable to the size and strength of the National Front, meaning that it should have been by a delegation that represents all the factions inside the Front, as well as it should have been through a considerable mediator , a mediator that Nimairi could not revoke his commitments with, where it guarantee the conditions that they agree upon.It was Libya they meant, but Libya couldn’t play this role especially after the regime accused it by trying to invade Sudan in 2 July1976 (2).

After the meeting of Port Sudan, al Sayid FatÊal RaÊmānal BashÌr delegatefromNimairi's side met Dr. assanal Turābi the leader of The Muslim Brotherhood, who was under arrest in Kobarprison and delivered to him the paper of the reconciliation and informed him by what happened between îādiq and Nimairi, and he found al Turābi open for reconciliation if there was a general amnesty to the political prisoners, and the comprehensive amnesty order was instated in August 1977 and afterwards al Turābi announced the nullification of the National Front on the premises  that its leader (al Sādiq al Mahdi) was using the name of the Front to score points for his party, also the history of the common work showed that the leadership of the Front was not committed by the declaration and always wanted to isolate the brotherhood (1)..

The Islamic movement had its own logic to accept the option of reconciliation and that was for two reasons: firstly, the problem of trust between the Brotherhood leadership and general population after the failure of the attempt of July 1976 and secondly, according to the reports that came to the Brotherhood leadership about the decrease in its members numbers, where the numbers of the Brotherhood decreased from 15% in the year 1969 to 6% in the year 1977.Also most of the leadership was in prisons or outside Sudan or cannotdo anything due to oppression and suppression.

The Islamic movement saw that through the reconciliation it wouldbe able to activate the Islamic movement and to diversify its ways of expression, and that was exactly what happened.At the public level it established social, political, women, developmental and voluntary associations in all of the Sudan, as well as attracting a generation of youth, and economically it produced various institutions, and the Brotherhood members entered the fields of development , insurance and banking, at the same time the reconciliation led to a split inside the party of  the Brotherhood from those who opposed the reconciliation with the regime under the leadership of îādiq Abdallah Abd al Māgid(1).

Al Turābi named the period (1977-1985) the empowerment period in his book “the Islamic Movement, development, method and gain” and he was right because his party controlled the banking and the economical systems and it ventured and monopolized sorghum the most prominent crop in Sudan (2)In addition to being able to plant its organization units inside the army to acquire the power in the future to actualize his dream to govern Sudan. The national reconciliation was strengthened through the increase in the number of the Brotherhood members in the military institutions and with the president adopting the laws of Islamic SharÌa, they opened the African Islamic Center which is one of the fronts of the Islamic Movement and its door for intellectual and educational training for tens of officers(3).

 

The other parties stance from the reconciliation:

The stance of the other parties from the reconciliation:

Many political parties stood an opposing position from the national reconciliation in 1977 of which some are from the right wing and some are fundamentalists.

The Democratic Unionist Party (al SharÌf  al Hindi faction):-

By the beginning of the year 1972 the regimes interest was pointed towards al SharÌf al Hindi at Saudi Arabia at the time, where a delegationconstituted of A'wad Abuzaid, Musa al Mubārak and Umar al āj Musa, initiated a discussion where they put forward a full conceptualization to regain trust between the two parties, and the delegation showed the will ofpresidentNimairi that al SharÌf returned  to Sudan to be responsible about the economical system and the return of the Front in constructing Sudan.

Al SharÌf put forward clear conditions and Nimairi accepted it, then Al SherÌf stipulated thatNimairibe commited to concludethe deal before King Faisal to become a witness of it.Nimairi came and held a meeting with al SharÌf in the presence of King Faisal presence, and both parties showed good well(1)..

Nimairi agreed to abide by the constitution and to allow public freedom andgurantee the independence of the judiciary system, as well as agreeing on the right of the people to vote for who represented them rightfully, and the cancelation of nationalization and confiscations and returning confiscatedassets to theirowners. Nimairi had a reservation on the last article, where he made it clear to Al SharÌf that it could be canceled but from where he would bring the money to compensate people, king Faisal resolved this by promising to pay the money.

 

King Faisal blessed the agreement and Nimairicommitted to announce it as soon as he had reached Khartoum, and al SharÌf usain was awaiting the announcement when to his surprise Nimairi’svoice came out of the radio insulting and disparaging him, that was when al SharÌf realized that Nimairi didn’t disappoint him by not staying with his promises and he then started preparing for his last fight with the regime July 1976 and he named it “the pride of revolutions”(2).

The regime defeated the movement of July 1976, and afterwards al SharÌf al Hindirealized the need for finding away of understanding with the regime, and this was what happened in London in April 1978 when he held a meeting with  delegates from the government headed by vice presidentUmar Mohammed al Tayib, where the leader of the opposition accepted the principle of one political party and that the Social Union was the accepted way for national work with the affirmation of building its structures and its organizations and all the responsibilities from the base to the top to be through elections so as to actualize the comprehensive national unity which was the goal of the president’s initiative (1).

All that al SharÌf usainal Hindi wanted was for the dialogue to be constructive and bold and address the real problems that Sudan suffered, and all that he wanted was justice and democracy and the wellbeing of the Sudanese people and that was what was not agreed upon in London(2)..

The trial of the reconciliation went against al Hindi and his calculations, but the situations only increased his dedicationand he stayed holding his card, and afterwards he was visited by AbuAlgāsimMohamed IbrahiÌm for the second time in London in April 1978 for the purpose of negotiations, but the negotiations did not gain anything and all of a sudden there was an open opportunitywhen  Nimairi stood by the treaty of Camp David between Egypt and Israel in 17/9/1978. It was as if al SharÌf was waiting for that opportunity to prove the reality of the regime whichdid not honor treaties and agreements, while alKhatmiya cult under the leadership of Mohammed Othman al Marghani was trapped in the National Reconciliation(3).

Al SharÌf redirected his attention to the left where he might find some solitude and compensate him for what he lost in the national front, the National Democratic Front was announced in November 1979 and the first achievement of this alliance was when it won the elections of Khartoum University Students Union in 2/3/1980 and the regime had no way at the time but to close the university, and that was exactly what happened to the Journalists Union where the new alliance also took the vote,andNimairilost again in 16/1/1978.

Al SharÌf allied with the Baa’th party to overthrow May regime, but their activity did not exceed secretive work represented by leaflets and the recruitment of students to the Baa’th ideology which was supported by the Iraqi government. Al SharÌf thought that Nimairi agreeing to the reconciliation was a bow from him before of the storm and to pass the crises, where his proposals for the reconciliation did not materialize and were just signs of unreal changes that he waved to have more time(1).In 1982 al SharÌf al Hindi died in Athena and was buried in Khartoum and thus the regime discarded from one stubbornopposer.

The Sudanese Communist Party:-

The communist party was prohibited over the fourteen years that followed the events of 19 July 1971 and the party continued its activities underground against the regime, but it lost its place as a party without a cult to the Muslim Brotherhood who allied with the regime since 1977, and since the national reconciliation,  the party slogan was a wide front for democracy and the salvation of the country, and it believed in the necessity of calling the people of Sudan for an upraise or general political strike which considered the fast and successfully tried road of October revolution(2).

A document was issued about the meeting of the central committee of the communist party in August 1977 to discuss the national reconciliation between the regime and the National Front, and it also discussed the rejectionist stance of the communist party and its call for forming a democratic front and saving the country, in addition to that, the document held the key for the solving the political crises, making it clear that every real reconciliation should acknowledgethe basic rights and full democracy and the document went even further saying: Sudan will never witness stability, development and prosperity unless through developing and completing the rights and freedoms that was actualized with the independence and every aim to rebound from these rights and freedoms and gains would fail it didn't matter if it came under an Islamic or a social constitution(1)..

The communists thought that the reconciliation happened between the regressive right at the expense of the progressive factions so their plan required the gathering of their people and to hurry in recruiting young officers and soldiers and they demanded freedoms and the creation of the Democratic Front and they relied on rumors and harassing the regime refusing to have a dialogue with it although there was a political understanding between the party and delegates from the regime “Abual GāsimHāshim and Abu al Gāsim Mohammed IbrāhÌm(2)

The SocialRepublicanParty :

The RepublicanParty welcomed the national reconciliation with the regime and it called for moving forward in it in the words of the second man in the party A'bd al LatÌf Umar asaballah who assured in a statement from the party with his signature on it in 31/7/1977. The statement also assured that parties in their traditional forms which were responsible for the corruption in governance would not come back, and that time had passed for the fundamentalist and cultic coalesces, as well as the solving of the problems of the era was in the existence of intellectual organizations in addition, the statement also called for a national declaration where the circle of national reconciliation was widened to include all the political powers and intellectual currents in the country with no exceptions, and that was to be approved  through a round table(1).

But the relationship between the republicans and Nimairi regime started to deteriorate after Nimairi started his Islamic orientation.Here MaÊmŪd Mohammed TāÊa, the leader of the RepublicanParty started criticizing the laws of September 1983(2). MaÊmŪd stated his opinion against the laws of September that they were against the Islamic SharÌa'a and more so that it disfigured SharÌa'a and Islam, in addition to that it misused the people and led them to be quite through humiliating them and then compromised the unity of the country.Also these laws humiliated free thoughts and harassed the political opposition. The republicans published their book “The Religious Bigotry Raises Disorder to Reach the Power” on the backgrounds of issuing those laws. The leadership of the Republicans were arrested of whom the most prominent wasMaÊmŪdMohammed Tāha and four of his students and were indicted with charges of apostasy, and the arrest lasted for more than a year and a half in Kobarprison, and in the 25th of December 1984 the republicans published their second leaflet “This or The Flood” in opposition to the laws of September.The government formed a court that ruled to execute MaÊmŪd and his students and MaÊmŪd refused to interact with the court stating that it was a tool in the hands of the regime. The execution was carried outon the 18th of January 1985 and his execution was the spark that started the uprising in April 1985(3)..

In this way the reconciliation went, so îādiqal Mahdi was back in the opposition, al SharÌf stayed away from the reconciliation while the Muslim Brotherhood were the only ones who benefited from the reconciliation where they benefitedon the organizational, economic and political levels(1)..

The results of the National Reconciliation 1977:

The National reconciliation between presidentGaa'farNimairi and the leaders of the National Front brought negative and positive results.

The positive results were the comeback of the members of the opposition from the training camps in the outside, as well as achieving political stability and the right atmosphere to push the development projects and encouraging foreign capital and halting the bloodshed and the armed conflicts(2)..

Many of the opposition members joined the regime and benefited from it, at the same time some of the leaders of the UmmaParty and the Muslim Brotherhood and the Unionists (al Marghani faction) attained ministrial positions due to the reconciliation(3).

îādiqal Mahdibelieves that the reconciliation closed the door for foreign influence in Sudan, that was why the reconciliation required the unification of all national efforts to solve the provincial problems and to prevent from misusing them to frustrate the unity of the country which was in the priorities of the colonial powers (4). As well as unifying the Sudanese would support stability, in addition to creating a democratic substitute to violence and oppression(5). While the most important results of the reconciliation according to îādiqal Mahdi are:-

a- the release of all the political prisoners.

b- Returning those who lost their jobs or their interests due to the previous political conflicts.

c- The removal of outside effects of the interior conflict and the countries relationship with its regional neighbors was back to normal(1).

d- Thereconsidering of the freedom limiting laws.

e- Parliament elections were held where citizens participated without discrimination.

f- Opening the parliament to reviewing the various laws as well as the local government institutions and the popular governance.

g- Retaining the position of UmmaParty and al Ansār as well as the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Islamic movement grew and became stronger after the reconciliation. Dr. al Turābi accepted the reconciliation with the regime of presidentNimairi from the empowering point of view which meant the freedom of Islamic Da'wa, and Nimairi condition for the Brotherhood members was to not practice political work in the name of a party or any front, so their leader al Turāby accepted that condition and decided to work through legal legitimacy. The brotherhood members main concern was the establishment of an Islamic movement in the country, and in popular front it witnessed huge success, in addition to that the brotherhood also controlled universities and higher institutions which constituted the center of the opposition in the country(2).

Many of the faces of the Islamic movement revived during the national reconciliation and the attorney general office and the Ministry of Justice were for the general secretary of the brotherhood al Turābi who did not assume in any public position since he was the dean of the law school at the University of Khartoum in 1964.

The Islamic movement fought in the parliament elections of 1979 and Ali Uthman Mohammed Tāha became the front man of the parliament, and many of the leaders of the brotherhood were appointed in the parliament such as YāsÌn Umar al Imām, al Tigāni AbuJidairi and Ahmed Abd al RaÊmān who became the head of the committee of guidance in the parliament as well as his position as the rapporteur  of the committee of immigrants and the fired grievancescommittee, while the Ansār held more thanthirty seats as well as the democratic Unionist party (al Mirghani faction)(1).

Al Turābi participated in governing in the position of the Minister of Justice and the attorney general as well as becoming the legal councilor of the president in addition to his participation in the ministerscouncil thus being able to effect the economic system.

Dr. assanMakky Ahmed summarizes in his book (the Islamic Movement In Sudan 1969-1985) the most prominent gains of the movement after the reconciliation in the appearance of Da'wa and the Islamicbusiness fronts from companies to banks such as Faisal Islamic Bank which was established in the year 1978 and al Tadāmon Bank which was established in the year 1983.There were also the establishment of organizations such as the Islamic Da’oa Organization, and the Islamic Aid Agency, the Renascence Women Pioneers association, the Construction Youth association, Dan Fodio institution …etc. as well as establishing educational institutions like the African Islamic Center, Quran Studies College and many kindergartensand primary schools that belong to the Islamic Da’waOrganization, together with the activity of the Brotherhood members in the markets and their expansion in trading after the privileges they were granted (loans and exemptions)(2).

While the negative results of the National Reconciliation are represented by the danger of the elements that were trained in the outside, where they had freedom of movement inside and outside the country with the possibility of venturing into the military, also the amnesty did not include the southern leaders who were against the treaty of Addis Ababa 1972 which lead to the believe that the amnesty was for the northerners alone, at the same time some of the National Reconciliation prominent figures who did not join the reconciliation worked to join the leftist parties who were againstNimairi’s regime, such as the alliance between al SharÌf al Hindi with the Social Arabian Revival Party (Baa'th Party) which was against the totalitarian regime of presidentNimairi(1.

Epilogue:

Nimairi resorted to reconcile with every faction in the National Front on its own, UmmaParty under the leadership of îādiqal Mahdiand the Democratic Unionist Party the  faction that is adversary to May regime under the leadership of al SharÌf usainal Hindi and the Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of assanal Turābi, and the reasons for the reconciliation was the National Front inability to strike May regime to overthrew it after they depleted their military powers due to Sha’bān revolution 1973 and the coup of lieutenant assanusain 1975 and lastly the movement of the 2ed of July 1976.

The mediators played important roles in the national reconciliation 1977 which the opposition forces reached with the regime of presidentNimairi, Nimairi's main objective from the reconciliation was just truce and a bow in front of the storm, he also sought to dismantle and to dissolute the opposition, he wanted to protect his regime which was failing, and since the end of the seventies of the twenties century the popular dissatisfaction started to grow as a result of the deterioration in living standards, and Nimairi’s policies did not succeed in absorbing the national anger so the result was the uprise of 6 April 1985 which overthrew the regime of presidentNimairi.

While îādiqal Mahdi had his own agenda from the reconciliation seemed forthcoming, but the conditions didn’t help him, where the signing of Camp David treaty in the year 1978 between Egypt and Israel prevented him from continuing all the way with May regime, so he sought the resignation, while the reconciliation did not benefital SharÌf al Hindi.

Generally the reconciliation reached a dead end because it lacked the institutional framework, and the participation of some of the leaders of the opposition was only figurative and empty of political content. And the Muslim Brotherhood only reconciled with the regime for opportunistic motives to enable the Brotherhood so they got what they wanted, where they entered the regime’s structures, so they were the only benefiters from the reconciliation, and they were destined to rule Sudan and that was after the coup of June 1989.

Sources and references

First, sources from National Archives:

A- 20/3/3 / Socialist Union, National Security, Department of Information, report a position under the light of national reconciliation in 1977.

B- newspapers:

1. Al SaÊāfa newspaper: issue number 561, 07/19/1977 .

2. al Aiyām: 07/27/2008.

Second, References:

1. Abel Alier: war and peace issues in Southern Sudan "comparative study", Dāral JÌl, Beirut, i1.1993.

2. Anthony Sylvester: Sudan under Nimeiri, Publishing House, Khartoum, i 1.1971 m.

3. assan Abdallah alTurābi: the Islamic movement in Sudan, "the development and gains and method," Khartoum, i 1.1410 Hejry.

4. assanMakki Mohamed Ahmed, the Islamic movement in Sudan 1969-1985, history and political discourse, the Research Institute of Social Studies, Khartoum, i 1.1990 .

5. aidarIbrahÌm: civil society and the democratic transformation of Sudan, the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development, Cairo, i 1.1996 .

6. Sumaya Sayed: the national reconciliation 1977, (the governance conflict in Sudan), new Sudan Press, Khartoum, d. T.

7. al SharÌf al Hindi: for my country and for history (1924 -1982), Khartoum, i1.2006.

8. £āhaIbrahÌm: Sudan Where to? Nimaiiri between negligence and failure of the parties, d. T.

9. Fuād Maðar: the first national reconciliation in Sudan (they relapsed it or it relapsed) Arab Institution for Studies and Publishing, Beirut, i1.1999.

10. Mohammed WgÌ' Allah, the brotherhood and the years in May, "the story of conflicts documentation and reconciliation," Ibn Hazm press Khartoum, d. T.

11. Mohammed Abu alQāsim alājamad, Sudan and the historical impasse "argumentative structure and future prospects 1956 -1969 ", vol 1, Ibn azm house for printing and publishing, Khartoum, i2.1996.

12. Mohamed Mohamed Ahmed Karrār: National Movement and the conflict with May, Thought House liberary, Khartoum, i1.1985.

13. Mohamed Mohamed Ahmed Karrār: events and mysteries of Sudanese politics (1930-1990), Albalad house for printing and publishing, Khartoum, i2.1998.

14. Mansour Khālid: Sudanese elite and addiction to failure, c 1, Alamen house for Publishing and Distribution, Khartoum, D.t.

15. MansŪrKhālid: There is no good in us if we didn't say it, authoring and publishing department, University of Khartoum, Khartoum, d. T.

16. YŪsufalSharÌf: Sudan and the people of Sudan, the secrets of politics and society, Crescent House, Cairo, DT

 


(1)Fouād Maðar: the first national reconciliation in Sudan (they relapsed it or it relapsed) Arab Institution for Studies and Publishing, Beirut, i1.1999 ..

(2)assanMakki Mohamed Ahmed, the Islamic movement in Sudan 1969-1985, history and political discourse, the Research Institute of Social Studies, Khartoum, i 1.1990 .

(3)YŪsufalSharÌf: Sudan and the people of Sudan, the secrets of politics and society , Crescent House, Cairo, DT

*the regime named it the conspiracy of Sha'ban while the opposition named it the uprising of Sha'ban.

(2) assanMakkey : ibid

 

(1) Abel Alier: war and peace issues in Southern Sudan "comparative study", Dar Elgeel, Beirut, i 1.1993

(1) Fuād Maðar : ibid p 208

(2) Yousef ElsharÌf : ibid

(1) Mansour Khāled : ibid p 557

(2) Mohammed Abu Elgāsem Haj Hammad : ibid.

(1) Mohammed Wgei Allah, the brotherhood and the years in May, "the story of conflicts documentation and reconciliation," Ibn Hazm press Khartoum

(2) TāhaIbrahÌm: Sudan Where to? Nimeiri between negligence and failure of the parties, d. T

(3) Hassan Makkey: ibid.    

(1)AlSharÌf al Hindi: For my country and for history (1924 – 1982), Khartoum, 1.1006

 

(1) Haidar Ibrahim: civil society and the democratic transformation of Sudan, the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development, Cairo, i 1.1996.

(2) Mohamed Mohamed Ahmed Karrār: events and mysteries of Sudanese politics (1930-1990), Albalad house for printing and publishing, Khartoum, i2.1998 .

(1) 20/3/3 / Socialist Union, National Security, Department of Information, report a position under the light of national reconciliation in 1977..

(1) Mansour Khāled : Sudanese elite and addiction to failure, c 1,Alamen house for Publishing and Distribution, Khartoum, D.t.

(3) Mansour Khāled : ibid

(1) Elsahāf newspaper: issue number 561, 07/19/1977

(2) yousefElsharif : ibid

(1) Hassan Makke : ibid.

(2) Hassan Abdallah al-Turābi: the Islamic movement in Sudan, "the development and gains and method

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