The most important battles of the Mahadist

Wed, 20 Sep 2017



Prepared by: Dr. Hatim Elseddeg Mohammed Ahmed

Abstract :

The Mahdi's revolution occurred in 1881 against the Turkish – Egyptian rule in Sudan . thisa revolution had nothing to do other than engaging in  continuous  battles to get foothold then ousting the ruling groups from Sudan. The Mahdi's first battle was Aba, then successes continued until the Mahdi's forces attacked Ubaid city and despite the defeat in this battle, Mahdi succeeded in  regrouping  his forces and changing his military tactics where he opted to seizure instead of assault, and therefore he won in different fronts, Osman Degna's victory in the east and Mahdi's battles in the center, west and south then the liberation of Khartoum in 26th of January 1885, shortly after that Imam Mahdi passed away where K halifa Abdullah found himself before real challenge as running the state in external and internal circumstances that were extremely complicated where the internal mutinies and external threat that was represented in Ethiopia and Egypt. Khalifa succeeded to some extent in the Internal part when he achieved important victory against the Ethiopians in the battle of Gallabat, but after this battle Khalifa didn't win battles anymore and Mahdist forces repeated defeated in Toshki, Karari and Omdebaikrat and the end of the Mehdi state was in 1899 where important page of Sudan was turned that was full of pros and cons.

Introduction

Aba Island battle, 16th of Ramadan 1298 h (12/8/1881)

Yousef Elshallaly campaign (29th of May 1882)

The liberation of Elubayed 1883

Shaikan battle 4 Moharram 1301/ 5th of November 1883

The liberation of Khartoum 26 January 1885

The battle of Gallabat 9 March 1889

The combat style of Prince Osman Digna

Battle of Toshky 3 August 1889

Battle of Kerry

Conclusion

Sources and references

 

Introduction:

The Mahadist and the state fought many interior and exterior battles that formed the history of the Mahadist in Sudan. These battles constituted the actual starting point of the Mahadist starting from the battle of Aba island battle in the year (1881) which constitutes the actual starting point of the Mahadist as well as the most important battle, then the battles rolled that constituted the military history of the Mahadist, where the fights in Ghadeer against Rashed and Elshallaly happened in which Imam Elmahdy won, and afterwards came the failed battle of Friday or the failed Friday or the Friday attack where Elmahdy lost ten thousand fighter and after this attack Elmahdy changed his fighting style from direct fights to sieges, which is a style that the mahadist were good at and became a model that was successfully  implemented in Para, Elubaed and Khartoum. The battle of Sheekan was one of the most strategic battles of the Mahadist which showed the leadership abilities of Elmahdy and the ingenuity of his commanders in running battles and winning them with minimal losses.

In addition to the battles of Imam Elmahdy in Kordufan and the liberation of Khartoum there was several important battles which happened in eastern Sudan led by Othman Digna where this commander succeeded in creating the state of chaos and disturbances in eastern Sudan which enabled Imam Elmahdy fighting the government troops in its garrison relatively easily, and even in era of Caliph Abdalla we find that Othman Digna was able to constitute a real threat to the government troops in Sawaken and to seize several cities in eastern Sudan and that’s why we are going to study some of his bottles in western Sudan.

After the death of Elmahdy, Caliph Abdalla faced several outside and inside troubles and that’s why the study took special care with some battles which took place in the era of the Caliph such as Elgallabat, Toshky and Karary battles. The onlooker to these fights finds that the Mahadist won Elgallabat but it lost in Toshky and Karary and that’s why we are going to shed the light on them to know the factors and reasons that led to the loss of these battles.

Aba Island battle, 16th of Ramadan 1298 h (12/8/1881):

The battle of Aba island in the year 1881 was one of the most important battles of the Mahadist and that’s due to several reason of which that this victory happened in a very hard complicated conditions, also Imam Elmahdy wasn’t planning for a battle with the government in Aba, the evidence for that is that the letters of Elmahdy used to invite his followers to immigrate to Ghadeer (Masa mountain) but the government finding one of the letters accelerated the fight between them[1].

The government sent commander Mohammed Raoof and his deputy Mohammed Abu Elso’od to Aba island to know the reality of the letter that they found, Abu Elso’od went and met with Elmahady and made sure that he is the owner of the letter, then Abu Elso’od tried to convince Elmahady to go to Khartoum with him but Elmahady refused and said that he is awaited for “Mahady”, then he moved toward Khartoum to tell the government that Elmahady was the owner of the letter and that he refuses to come to Khartoum[2].

Mohammed Abu Elso’od was hoping that Elmahady would surrender for him and go to Khartoum with him, but it was obvious that Mohammed didn’t know Elmahdy well and his persistence on his stances, at the same time Elmahdy has started a quest that had to get to its end, this quest started with inviting his follower to emigrate to Ghadeer.

After this meeting which happened in a hurry, Mohammed Abu Elso’od told Elmahdy that he can’t confront the government, but Elmahdy told him that he will fight with what he got, then Abu Elso’od knew that Elmahdy won’t go to Khartoum with him without using force [3].

Preparation for the fight:

After Abu Elso’od return to Khartoum, Elmahdy sent letters to the tribes of Doghaim, Kenana, Amarna, Hasanat and Elfallata inviting them to join him in Aba, and in the evening of Friday the 16th of Ramadan, and after Eltaraweeh prayers, Imam Elmahdy met with several of boat makers in the district of Elfashashoya, of which Mustafa Sulaiman, Othman Hajj Sherfy and told them that the government sent a campaign to eliminate him in Aba, and afterwards, Elmahady entered his mosque in Aba and got out several flags and distributed it among his followers and divided them into groups, they were around 313 to 350 and Elmahdy took their vows to die for him and divided the groups into tens and over every group a lieutenant and one of the most famous lieutenants was Omer Ellahawy, Omer Elsaroray, Elshiekh idrees the poet and many more [4].

The battle:

Abu Elso’od troops moved from Khartoum in the 11th of August 1881 on Ismailia ship and in other saying it was two ships, and they arrived to Aba island after ten hours with a force composed of 650-850 of government troops under the leadership of Mohammed Abu Elso’od armed with Remington firearms and they landed on the southern of Aba island [5].

Abu Elso’od’s troops were accompanied with Aba Mohammed Othman Abu Garga and Elshiekh Fadlo from (Om Ghonaim) village by the white Nile and they were accompanied with Zyada Abdalla and Mohammed Abu Shok as guides and they are from Elfashashoya village [6].

Elmahdy battle plan:

Elamahdy led his troops by himself and they stood between the trees awaiting the arrival of the governmental troops. The troops of Elmahdy relied on simple weapons such as swords and spears and sticks but they had deep faith on their cause against the government’s troops firearms[7].

Imam Elmahdy tried to ably the style of surprise against Abu Elso’od’s troops, exploiting the apparent disturbance in the troops of the enemy, and in spite of the limited time, Elmahdy formed his troops in four axes and attacked Abu Elso’od’s troops at once and the battle didn’t last for more than seven minutes where Elmahdy won. Elmahdy ordered to collect the weapons and the spoils. They arrested nine people from the government troops and Elmahdy prayed Elfajur prayer on two stalments and Elnoggara was played to gather the people and he entered his private place to wash a wound that was inflicted on him during the battle[8].

We can say that there was several factors helped Elmahdy win the battle, of which the following:

  • Elmahdy use of the surprise style.
  • El Mahdi to benefited from the high morale of his forces
  • El Mahdi benefited from climate factors and the environment and of the rain which hit the island Aba before the day of the battle and the forest, which has embraced the battle which formed a natural barrier to El Mahdi and his forces.
  • - Al Mahdi benefited from the way in which the forces of Abu Saud landed on the island where the descending of these forces irregularly enabled El  Mahdi to eliminate them.
  • - Al Mahdi benefited from the slowness of the firearms that were used by the Abu Saud where the high moral of Al Mahdi forces was faster than the shots.

It was clear from the victory in Aba island that the procedures that Elmahdy took gave him victory and guarantied his victory over Abu Elso’od and Elmahdy and his troops were fighting to achieve victory while the troops of the government were having military duty like all the duties they did before [9].

The battles of Elmahdy in Ghadeer:

After the victory in Aba, Elmahdy knew that the government won’t leave him alone that’s why he decided to go to Ghadeer to take cover there and then to decide what to do next to confront the government where he became one of the it most prominent enemies.

Elmahdy tried to mimic the prophet Mohammed in the matter of emigration to Ghadeer (Masa mountain) and that’s why he said (… the master of all the universe told me and guided me to write to all the Muslims to emigrate with us, it’s very important and no one should disobey it…) and the emigration helped Elmahdy and his troops to get far away from the garrisons of the government and are a real test to the readiness of the people to join the Mahadism and it’s a strategic process that gave Elmahdy a big opportunity to prepare his troops to confront the government in an open battle field[10].

Elmahdy troops in Ghadeer:

Elmahdy moved to Ghadeer in south Kurdofan and in the way he was joined by prince Abdurrahman Elnojomy and Sheikh Elhusain Elzahra’ and many of the tribes people in the way to Ghadeer and the parade went through the lands of Elgeme’ and Elahamda then Tagaly until it reached Ghadeer after three months[11].

After he arrived at Ghadeer Elmahdy prepared his troops for defensive battles in spite of the apparent fatigue that hit his troops, he also succeeded in inviting the tribes of the Nuba mountains to Mahdism and succeeded in that, the mountains also constituted a point of scouting and defense too.

In the Ghadeer Al Mahdi began training his forces on a joint coherent units fighting instead of the random fighting of the tribes which was prevalent at that time.[12]

Rashed Pik Ayman’s campaign (9 December 1882):

Rashed Pik Ayman the administrator of Fashoda knew after hearing about the victory of Elmahdy that his enemy can’t be fought directly and that’s why he decided to surprise him in Ghadeer and that’s why he gathered his troops in Fashodah and with the help of Elmak (Keykoon) the Mak “king” of Sholok where his force reached 700 formal soldier and a thousand from Sholok armed with firearms and moved to Fashodah from the side of Elmahdy in Ghadeer in secret, but Rabhah Elkenanya succeeded in carrying the news to Elmahdy in Ghadeer[13].

Rashid Pik Ayman was one of the Turkish leaders who were famous for his courage and was very ambitious, and when he knew that  Elmahddy has arrived in Ghadeer and that his forces were ridden with fever and that he was tired he decided to attack him so he could achieve the highest orders if he succeeded in his mission, at the same time, Rashid Pik Ayman was transgressing the military orders because the commander in Khartoum didn’t give the permission to attack Elmahdy in Ghadeer [14].

Winston Churchill in his book “the history of the Mahadist revolution” sees that Rashed Pik Ayman is a man of initiative but had so little experience in war matters and that he decided to take initiative and arrest Elmahdy without any precautions [15].

If Rashed Pik Ayman had no experience according to Churchill, he wanted to make personal glory and that’s through eliminating Elmahdy and thus become famous.

The arrival of the campaign to Ghadeer:

Rashid Pik Ayman strained his troops with constant walking to surprise Elmahdy and when he arrived there the troops of Elmahdy attacked him and they were able to break the castle formation that he was using also the knights of Elmahdy were able to follow the troops of Rashid and killing them [16].

Elmahdy’s tactic in attacking Rashid Pik Ayman:

The leadership abilities of Elmahdy helped immensely in achieving victory over Rashid Pik Ayman and his troop and that through planning to attack Rahid’s forces at the entrance of the forest that lies at the edges of Ghadeer and it was the only way that the forces of Rashid could take, Elmahdy also sent two groups of Knights for scouting and chasing, Elmahdy decided to attack Rashid’s forces when half of it was inside the forest and the other half outside, that’s how Elmahdy was able to eliminate all the campaign of Rashid and only one hundred prisoner survived and one officer who ran with his horse to Fashoda, this is considered the first victory Elmahdy achieved against formal troops that came to eliminate him[17], and Elmahdy got from Rashid’s troops around a thousand Remington riffle [18].

Its considered the second victory of Elmahdy, and this victory had the effect of magic in the midst of Elansar and people came from all over to vow alliance, as well as got a lot of spoils.

Yousef Elshallaly campaign (29th of May 1882):

After the defeat of Rashid Pik Ayman commander Mohammed Rau’f was impeached and commander Abdulgader Pasha Hilmy was appointed in his place, and before the arrival of the new commander (Giggler) Pasha the German consultant was appointed a temporarily and he decided to eliminate Elmahdy in Ghadeer after the Egyptian government have him permission, Giggler prepared a campaign from the garrisons of Khartoum, Sennar and Elubayed contained 2000 formal soldier and 1500 informal soldier with three cannons, he appointed Yousef Elshallaly as a leader to the campaign the governor of Sennar, and he is an expert in administrative work and military work in Bahr Elghazal And Elestewaea, the campaign also included Taha Abu Sadr one of the Shaygya leaders and Abdalla Pik Dafallah the brother of Ahmed Pik Dafalla one of the biggest merchants of Elubayed [19].

Elmahdy and the campaign news:

Elmady used to receive the news of the campaign from Mak (Adm Om Dapalo) king of Tagly and for more information Elmahdy sent several of his Knights for scouting and information collecting of them: Othman Zelfy and Mohammed Haj Sharfy he also dent other group to Mak (Tefra) the king of (Finger) mountain and that after Abu ELso’od forces arrived to Fashoda , and some of the scouts fell in the hands of Elshallaly and he killed them all which had a bad influence on the soldiers of Elshallaly and that’s due to what the soldiers showed of bravery [20].

The defeat of Elshallaly:

Letters were exchanged between Elmahady and Elshallaly and in one of these letters Elshallaly asked Elmahdy to surrender and assured him that he is not the awaited for Mahdy and his followers are mere Baggarah and a bunch of ignorant, Elshallaly afterwards advanced to Fashoda in the west until he arrived to Ghadeer where the troops of Elmahady attacked Elshallaly’s forces in 30 May 1882 and the campaign was eliminated and Yousif Elshallaly and Abdalla Pik Dafallah were murdered, after this victory, Elmahdy gained a lot of spoils and weapons and the number of Elmahdy followers increased until it reached 8000 and the government received a painful hit after the defeat [21].

After these victories Elmahdy gained a lot of weapons and ammunition and people pledged alliance to him and their faith in him increased so he worked on organizing his army and divided it into banners and appointed Caliphs and he compiled huge number of prayers in one book and called it (Elratib) [22].

The defeat of Yousef Elshallaly I think was expected because he thought that he could defeat Elmahdy but he forgot that Elmahdy was the initiative owner and also the fight field as well as the increase in the number of his followers which gave him additional ability to gather troops to achieve victory over any forces that come to him in Ghadeer.

The liberation of Elubayed 1883:

After the victories that were achieved against Rashid and Elshallaly, Elmahdy realized the weakness of the Turkish-Egyptian rule in the military side and that’s why Kurdofan became the main goal of Elmahdy, where he could control most of its garrisons and that’s why he decided from Ghadeer and secretively to move toward Elubayed in July 1882, Elmahdy moved towards Elubayed and didn’t take firearms with him which he gained in the previous battles and that’s because he wanted for the Ansar to fight as the prophet used to fight and that the prophet didn’t use firearms, as well as he wanted to asure the Ansar that the Mahdism doesn’t require firearms [23].

Before Elmahdy move to Elubayed he sent two messengers to Mohammed Sa’eed the administrator of Elubayed asking him to surrender the city but Mohammed S’eed captured the messengers and executed them [24].

From that we find that Mohammed Sa’eed didn’t benefit from Elshallaly’s experience who also killed the messengers, and this had a negative impact among the citizens of Elubayed because the messengers of Elmahdy showed great courage in front of death.

The way was clear in front of Elmahdy to reach Elubayed and that’s due to the treaties and agreements he could make with people of religion and merchants inside and outside Elubayed, as well as the followers of Elmahdy were able to start revolution in the regions that contained garrisons such as Ashaf and Eltayara, and after Elmahdy arrived near Elubayed he sent several warnings that invites the people to join him [25]. And he was joined by Elyas Pasha Om Preer and Abdulrahman Bannaga, and Mohammed Ismael and the son of Areek and the son of Salih Sewar Eldahab and those are leaders of the commercial, social, and religious activities whom Elmahdy knew when he visited Elubayed for the first time [26]. Elmahdy troops  camped near Kaba which is six miles away from Elubayed to the southwest of the city, then he called Faky (Elmanna Ismail) from Eltabara and joined Elmahdy in the way Abdalla Wad Elnour who camped with his troops in Khor  Taggat in north east the city [27].

The failed attack on Elubayed, Friday 24th of Shawal 1299 h/ 8 September 1882:

The failed attack of Friday on Elubayed is considered the first incident where the idealism of Elmahdy collided with reality, Elmahdy used to achieve his victories using nothing but white weapons and he didn’t use firearms which he left in Ghadeer, Elmahdy forgot that his previous battles used to be in the open and that he was able to actively and quickly surprise the enemy and work on limiting the power of firearm, but this time the city was fortified with a trench which Mohammed Sa’eed built since Elmahdy came to Ghadeer which gave the city additional force and several cannons were put on the towers that were built to protect the city against the expected attacks of Elmahdy, Elmahdy’s troops were easy targets to the firearms and ELansar couldn’t enter the city. Elmahdy lost in this attack around ten thousand soldier and his troops retreated from the city [28].

After the defeat:

After the defeat Elmahdy’s troops retreated to (Elganzara) spring, and several of Mohammed Sa’eedd’s followers recommended attacking Elmahdy but he refused this idea because he feared that the troops of Elmanna Ismail’s will attack the city after he gets out of it. The defeat of Friday is considered the first defeat that Elmahdy’s troops received after the first victory in Aba, and it’s said that Caliph Abdalla asked Elmahdy to return to Ghadeer or to go to Darfur to be away from the government but this suggestion was opposed strongly by Elyas Pasha Om Berer whom his fate was linked with Mahadism that’s why he suggested to Elmahdy to move his camp to (Elganzara) spring near Elubayed and to bring the firearms from Ghadeer and Elmahdy succeeded in that, and then changed his style from attacking to embargo after composing the Jihadist squad and at the same time Elmahdy troops besieged the city of Para through Elfaky and Elmanna and Rahma Mohammed Menofaly [29].

We find that the attack of Friday made Elmahdy change his military tactic and that through changing his style from attacking to embargo then his use of firearms and creating a new squad the Jihadist squad which helped immensely in besieging and liberating cities like Elubayed, Para, Eddalang Eshaf and Ettayara.

Elmahdy brought the firearms from Ghadeer and created a new squad known as the Jihadist under the leadership of Hamdan Abu Anga, and the Jihadist are the troops of the government in the Turkish garrisons who were captured by Elmahdy during his battles against the government and most of the soldiers of the Jihadist were from Nuba and southern tribes. After commander Abdulghader Pasha Helmy knew the gravity of the situation in Kurdofan and that the city of Elubayed is threatened by elmahdy, he sent a rescue campaign through Para, and when Elmahdy knew the news he ordered to bound the wells which helped in exhausting this force and when they came close to Para in October 1882, it was stopped by the forces of Elmanna Ismail and Rahma Mohammed Manofl and they were able to kill it leader and half of the troops and the rest escaped to Elubayed [30].

The liberation of Elubayed:

The city of Para was surrendered through its leader at the time Elnoor Angarra who later became a prominent figure in Mahadism after a heavy embargo by prince Abdurrahman Elnogoumy in the 6th of January 1883 after it lost hope in the arrival of another rescue campaign and Elmahdy assuring them safety to the people of the city who came to vow alliance to Elmahdy in Elganzara spring [31].

After surrendering the city of Para Elmahdy besieged Elubayed after consulting Elyas Pasha Om Berer who mentioned to Elmahdy that this siege is going to lead to the surrender of the city after the city becomes out of stocks and the collapse of the moral of the people and the government troops and if the government tried to send a campaign to stop the siege, the Ansar will work on eliminating it before its arrival to Elubayed [32].

The siege was so heavy on the city until the people ate dead cattle and the skin of animals even Gum Arabic and the prices of grain rose and people couldn’t bear it anymore that’s why many of the population ran out of the city and joined Elmahdy’s camp [33].

In the end Mohammed Sa’eed surrendered the city to Elmahdy in 15 January 1883, and ELmahsy entered the city with his troops, the Ansar attacked the city looking for spoils and money in a city that was known as the best trading city in Sudan. The liberation of Elubayed had the effect of magic on the followers of Elmahdy, and it was practically proved that battles tactics could change according to place and time [34].

The liberation of ELubayed resumed the moral to the mahadist revolution which was about to fade after the failed attack of Friday.

Shaikan battle 4 Moharram 1301/ 5th of November 1883:

Shaikan battle or (Hicks campaign) is considered one of the most important and remarkable battles of Mahdism, where Imam Elmahdy used the best military tactics and was able to achieve victory over the English/Egyptian forces and to break what is known as the English square which was remarkably strong in the British empire battles.

After the beginning of the Mahadist revolution and the victories of Imam ELmahdy, Briton sent colonel Stewart to write reports about the situation in Sudan, where he wrote a full report where he said: “… and their soldiers do not know how to use firearms and many of them think that Elmahdy has magical powers…) after this the government in Cairo impeached commander Abdulghader Pasha Helmy and appointed in his place Alaa Eddeen Pasha and thus Cairo lost its best men in Sudan and colonel Hicks was nominated, the retired officer of the Indian army, to leadership in Egypt to lead the campaign to annihilate Elamhdy and he was joined by several European officers such as major Farquhar captain Herlth the British and Baron Eskendarof the Prussian. The campaign left Cairo towards Khartoum quickly and it arrived in the 7th of March 1883 [35].

The relationship between the leaders of Hicks’s campaign and commander Ali Eddeen Pasha and Nyazy Pasha the general commander tautened and the reason behind that was that Hicks thought that the executive power and the activities should be under his leadership and at the time Sulaiman Nyazy had the right to lead the campaign because he was the general leader of the army in Sudan and in spite of these conflicts the campaign was able to achieve some success in White Nile against the groups of Wad Elmokashfy and Abdalla Bargoup and their followers from Johaina, Lahaween, Shenkhab and Kawahla and these activities were the suggestions of Nyazy Pasha, where he ordered to clean some buckets by the white Nile and they achieved some victories until they arrived at Elgabalain.
 

The composition of the campaign:

Hicks’s campaign was composed of 12900 soldiers and individuals that moved in the shape of a box with five blocks of Pashpozog and four thousand “Crop” cannon and ten mountainous cannons and six cannons (Nord Flute) and six submachine guns (Metraluze) the campaign was accompanied with 2000 executives and followers as well as the supplies and the weapons were carried on the back of 1000 animal and the campaign moved from Edweem in 27 September 1883 [36].

The campaign was accompanied with British news papers reporters in order to document and write news reports. From the newspapers that accompanied the campaign (the times) (the graphic) Hicks also took several Sudanese with him so they could become rulers over Kurdofan after he annihilates Mahadism such as (Ganawey Pik Abu Amory) and (Busaty Balla Elmahasy) the writer Khartoum and (Hamad Pik Elteleb) the head of the appeals court and (Mahmoud Pik Hmadany Elkanzy) the administrator of Khartoum and (Abdulrahman Pik Bannaga Elga’aly) he also kept colonel (Dah Coaltegen) as staff of war in white Nile between Khartoum and Fashoda to bar the citizens from following Elmahdy in Elubayed [37].

Hicks’s campaign was a mixture of Egyptian Sudanese, Turk, and some European officers from different communities and different backgrounds in addition to all that they did not have a clear goal nor a connection to the cause, the European officers were mercenaries that were after adventure and the Egyptian officers are the remains of Uraby’s army they were brought to Sudan chained and the Sudanese soldiers were working to keep their job and the huge number of animals kept the campaign moving slowly and they always needed water and food and the followers were another burden on leaders of the campaign [38].

Elmahdy’s preparation to confront the campaign:

Elmahdy knew about the campaign since it moved out of Khartoum through his intelligence and he kept receiving the news and after the campaign left Eddwem, Elmahdy sent a group of his followers to engage with the campaign under the leadership of Mohammed Othman Abu Garga, Abdulhaleem, and Amer Elyas Om Berer [39].

Elmahdy sent letters to the tribes that were dispersed after the liberation of Elubayed he also got out of the city with his troops and prepared a huge camp where all the loyal tribes gathered and was supervising the training by himself as well as he sent letters to the tribes by the road that the campaign was going to take telling them to empty the road [40].

The Imam succeeded in using the psychological war against the troops of the campaign that were moving toward him in Elubayed, he also benefited from the geographical and the climate factors in the region to achieve a huge victory over this campaign and the procedures that Elmahdy used helped in planting fear amongst the campaign soldiers, and it was obvious that Elmahdy was planning for this battle and he was better than the leaders of the campaign.
Eddweem was around 250 miles away and that’s why the campaign moved through the road that was chosen by Ali Eddeen Pasha which is: “Shat, Hegleega, Om Depekrat, Aladya, Arrahd, Alaweya until it reached Folat Elmasareen in the 3rd of November 1883 where Hicks sent a letter to Elmahdy were he promised him defeat if he did not surrender to his army that was moving towards Elubayed [41].

The division of Elmahdy’s army:

To confront Hicks’s campaign Elmahdy divided his army into its three banners which appeared since Ghadeer, the blue banner to the people of the west, the green banner to the tribes of the white Nile and the red banner to the people of northern Sudan and Eljazeera, the blue banner was under the leadership of prince Yagoup (Gorab Erray) and the green banner under the leadership of prince Musa Wad Helo and Elbasheer Agab Alfyah, and the red banner under the leadership of prince Abdulrahman Ennogoumy, and the Jihadist force under Hamdan Abu Anga and the number of the troops of the Jihadist force reached six thousand soldier divided into quarters [42].

The conflict between Hicks and Alaa Eddeen Pasha was so intense, it was even said that the soldiers and officers showed hatred and disobedience and in Friday the first of Moharram 1301 the campaign reached Shaikan forest and in the second day Elmahdy forces occupied (Elberkah) and the reason behind that was that the forces of the campaign do not control it, the number of Elmahady forces according to Ibrahim Fawzy was fifty thousand fighter armed with various weapons, and as a result of the heavy thirst one of the campaign soldiers ran to Elmahdy camp and told him all the details that’s when Elmahdy decided to confront the campaign and that was in the fourth of Muharram 1301 h [43].

Hicks’s forces entered the forest of Shaikan in severe fatigue and lack of water and in the 5th of November 1883 the campaign was divided into three boxes, that’s when Elmahdy gave the signal to start the attack, and the battle turned into a massacre and a lot of the soldiers and the officers were killed and most of the campaign was exterminated and the Europeans (Odo Novan) the reporter of the Daily News was killed also Fiztly the painter of London News newspaper, the only European to survive was called Goastaf Klutz who joined the camp of Errahad in Errahad, and that’s how the biggest campaign to destroy Elmahdy was exterminated , and after seven days from the victory Elmahdy entered Elubayed city in a huge parade surrounded by the Ansar from everywhere with a number of prisoners who were captured after distorting the campaign [44].

The conflicts between the leaders of the campaign contributed to destroying it by Elmahdy, also these constant conflicts made the campaign lose its focus on its main mission which is eliminating Elmahdy.

Results of Shaikan battle:

The victory of Elmahdy in Shaikan brought about several results, which are the following:

  • Elmahdy became famous locally and globally, some delegation came to him from Hejaz, India, Tunisia and Marrakech.
  • After this victory Elmahdy’s main concern became to control Khartoum and eliminate the Turkish-Egyptian rule for good from Sudan.
  • The government withdrew its far garrisons to Khartoum so they won’t fall in the hands of Elmahdy such as Elkowa, Fashooda, Edwaim which paved the way for Imam Elmahdy to march to Khartoum afterwards.
  • Elmahdy gained financially and morally.
  • Elmahdy was able after Shaikan to isolate Darfur, Bahr Elghazal and the equator from Khartoum and control them later [45].
  •  

The liberation of Khartoum 26 January 1885:

After the victories that Elmahdy achieved in Kordufan and eliminating Hicks’s campaign the Egyptian government decided to evacuate Sudan and that’s why Abdulghader Pasha was chosen who refused this mission and then Gordon Pasha was chosen and he agreed to do this mission based on his previous experience in Sudan where he worked as an administrator over the equator then commander of Sudan in the era of Khedewy Ismail Pasha [46].

Gordon moved from Aswan accompanied by colonel Stewart the officer in the Egyptian army Ibrahim Fawzy and after he reached to Berber he sent a letter to Elmahdy in Elubayed with some gifts and appointing him a governor over Kordufan and he asked him to release the European prisoners and to work on resuming trade between Kurdofan and the rest of Sudan, he also asked him to work on fixing the Telegraph line between Kurdofan and Khartoum, the point of this letter was to arose conflict between Elmahdy’s followers after this generous offer according to Stewart, Gordon was hoping that the followers of Elmahdy will persuade him to accept the offer [47].

Letters were exchanged between Elmahdy and Gordon since the latter was in Berber and those letters reached eight letters and two supplementary, in one of them Gordon said : (… if you wanted to be a sultan over Kurdofan we give it to you to be a sultan…) [48] and in another letter Elmahdy invites Gordon Pasha to leave Christianity and to embrace Islam and that if he followed Elmahdy he earned the honor of this world and the next world, or he will die with the sins of himself and his followers [49].

We can say that the ego of Gordon Pasha prevented him from seeing the place Elmahdy achieved and how consistent his forces were and how they obey him, in the same time the control of Elmahdy over Kordufan became a reality as well as Darfur, Bahr Elghazal and eastern Sudan and that the revolution was taking place all over Sudan and that Khartoum became the next station.

The siege of Khartoum:

An early siege was placed on Khartoum, he sent Mohammed Othman Abu Garga to Khartoum to besiege the city and he named him (the prince of the two lands and the two rivers) Elmahdy also called for a general “Nafeer” in ELjazeera and the regions around Khartoum and Abu Garga arrived to Elgeraif in the south of Khartoum    [50].

To tighten the siege over Khartoum, Elebaid Wad Badur was appointed to make the siege from the direction of the east but his forces endured several defeats and he asked for a supply from Elmahdy, and Gordon after he arrived to Khartoum tried to fortify it and defend it against Elmahdy, Elmahdy afterwards moved in a big army from the Elubayed until he reached Errahad[51].

 

The forces of sheikh Mohammed Elkhair the teacher of Elmahdy in March 1884 were able to cut the telegraph lines that connects Cairo to Khartoum which added to the isolation of the city from the outside world, and at that time Gordon had a historical chance to escape from Khartoum in the period from 18 February from Khartoum in the period from 18 February his arrival date  until 12 March the beginning of the siege in Khartoum with his employees the Egyptian and other foreigners through Berber but he lost that historical chance [52].

The fortification of Khartoum by Gordon Pasha:

To add to the fortifications around the city and to prevent it from falling in the hands of the troops of Elmahdy, Gordon Pasha worked on putting mines and iron masses inside the Nile in the season of the water levels rise and he increased the depth of the trenches  in the southern direction of the city, at that time Elmahdy sent prince Abdurrahman Ennogoumy the general prince over the army to Khartoum where he wrote to Gordon asking him to surrender so Gordon replied saying: “… I don’t care for you nor your master Elmahdy…) [53].

After Hamdan Abu Anga arrived in Omdurman he succeeded in controlling the “Twaby” that protects Khartoum from the direction of Omdurman and that helped in alleviating the moral of Elmahdy, which reflected on his troops, and the control of Omdurman became the real key to control Khartoum afterwards, after the pressure was increased on the city through a plan that Elmahdy devised to smother the city.

After controlling Omdurman Elmahdy worked to increase the siege over Khartoum and that’s why Caliph Abdalla asked Mohammed Zagal in Elfasher to supply Elmahdy forces with the weapons that he have, and Caliph Abdalla specified the Remington [54].

In another letter dated 20 Safar 1302/1882 Caliph Abdalla insisted on Mohammed Zagal in asking for the weapons because liberating the city required more weapons, and because the siege is from three directions and for the need for guns powder [55].

Caliph Abdalla also asked from Mohammed Zagal also to use camels and to rent them from Darfur’s Arab.

 

Caliph Abdalla determined the need of the troops from weapons to Mohammed Zagal that it should not be less than the load of two thousand camel, which are quantities that Elmahdy asked for[56] .

The ask for military supply from Mohammed Zagal was an important military procedure and that’s to tighten the siege on the city, and bringing more weapons and ammunition lifted the spirit of the Army.

And we find that Elfasher helped hugely in supplying the troops of Elmahdy with weapons and in liberating Khartoum, and to accelerate the process of moving the weapons from Darfur to Khartoum.

In addition to the weapons and gun powder caliph Abdalla asked from Mohammed Zagal, he asked him to prepare the forces of Pazenger and Jihadist, and that’s to support the troops that were besieging the city (… accelerate sending part of the Jihadist and part of Pazenger with their weapons with and part of the horses …) [57]

The battle of Abu Telaih and the liberation of Khartoum:

In spite the defeat of Elmahdy forces in Abu Telaih where they were after prohibiting the arrival of the rescue campaign to Khartoum, but its considered one of the most important battles in the history of Mahadism where this battle was able to set back the rescue campaign which helped Elmahdy to attack Khartoum.

After the news of the defeat arrived to Elmahdy, he held a war council included in it his Caliphs and the leaders of the Ansar and his relatives, the idea of retreating to Kurdofan was put forwards, in the beginning it was supported, but one of the most prominent people to stand against to the idea was Mohammed Abdulkareem Elmahdy’s uncle, and as a result of his opposition the council decided to attack Khartoum before the arrival of the rescue force, the idea of the attack was supported by some of the people who escaped the city where they showed Elmahdy the weaknesses spots in some areas from which they could enter the city [58].

 

The collapse of Khartoum fortifications:

Khartoum used to be surrounded with many fortifications, like Elkalakla and Burry, and the troops that were distributed over the fortifications were five “Aurts” of soldiers, and 25 “Aurdy” from the Pashpozog and Elshaygya , and a trench was dogged between the White and The Blue Niles to protect the city and barbed wires were put on it and nails and “Deresa” [59] and the goal behind this was to prevent entering the city, but Elmahdy was knowing everything and that was through the people who escaped in the evening of Sunday Jumad Elawal 1305/ 25 January 1885, Elmahdy crossed the white Nile to the Ennogoumy’s camp and consulted him about the attack, and they agreed that the attack will be in the dawn of Monday Jumad Elawal 1305h/ 26 January 1885 and by the dawn the attack on the city started, Elmahdy chose this time so the government forces can’t cause him any losses [60].

Enogoumy was the leader of the attack from the side of the White Nile with 40 thousand fighter, and he was able to penetrate the fortifications through a small opening between the fortifications, , there was almost twenty thousand soldier distributed over the fortifications, and after the arrival of the forces of Ennogoumy the forces started confronting the fortifications, and after the arrival of the army of Enogoumy the forces started confronting the fortifications in the attack, and the first group was able to arrive to Gordon’s residence and killing him and the city was liberated in a small time and that was in the 26th of January 1885 [61].

After liberating the city, Elmahdy entered it with the Ansar and he prayed Jumaa there. Holt mentioned that Elmahdy wanted to use it as a capital and a huge house was prepared for Elmahdy, also Caliph Abdalla used the governors house as his residence and other houses were prepared for the leaders but the plan was changed afterwards and Omdurman became the capital of the state, Elmahdy didn’t stay for long after liberating Khartoum and died in 9 Ramadan 1302h/22 June 1885 after he got fever [62].

The battle of Gallabat 9 March 1889:

The Abyssinian front was not among the priorities of Caliph Abdalla who took the power after the death of Elmahdy, but many factors made the Caliph notice his relation to Abyssinia, among these factors was the forces stationed in Gallabat, if left without war it will attack the regions of production and Gadaref is not far away from Gallabat add to that that the forces of Mahadism in these regions reached sixty thousand fighter [63].

 

Succeeded in the governing of Elgallabat Mohammed Wad Elaraba who was killed by the Abyssinians then Younis wad Eddekaim and Hamdan Abu Anga then Younis was impeached and sent to Dongola in the year 1888 and Hamdan Abu Anga became the general commander of the Army and the prince of Elgallabat, Hamdan attacked Abyssinia in 9 January 1888 with a huge Army which he divided into quarters and each quarter was under one of his commanders, Ahmed wad Ali , Abdalla Wad Ibrahim, Ezzaky Tamal and Arabi Dafa’alla [64].

Hamdan Abu Anga achieved many victories over the Abyssinians and worked on fortifying Elgallabat against expected attacks, because King Johanna thought of attacking the city and planned that as a payback for the defeats he suffered there, Johanna rallied all the Abyssinians to achieve a fast victory over the Ansar, Johanna was able to rally 250 thousand fighter with the leaders of the Abyssinians and the heads of the regions like (Ras Adal) and (Ras Allola) and Haily Maryam and Salih Shenga the leader of Takareer, and marched with his army towards Elgallabat [65], and after Hamdan Received the news of this campaign he fortified the city with a huge barn and a wall to protect the families and the ammunition and grains and he made four doors to the barn and on each door a cannon, and before Hamdan could complete building the barn he became sick and died in the 29th of January 1889 and his death was a shock to all the army in Elgallabat and to Caliph Abdalla in Omdurman because he was one of the most excellent leaders of Mahadism [66], after the death of Hamdan Abu Anga Caliph Abdalla appointed Abdalla Ezzaky Tamal as the commander of the army and the prince of Elgallabat and the whole army vowed to him. Ezzaky was one of the most prominent leaders of Mahadism and he had experience with war and while Ezzaky was getting ready to confront Johanna and the Abyssinian army he completed the fortification of the city and rallied the tribes, Johanna was planning to control Elgallabat and to make it the limit between him and Mahadists.[67]

King Johanna’s forces besieged Elgallabat in 6 Rajab 1306h/1888 and his troops started hitting the city with firearms, and the number of the force of Mahadists was 75 fighter and the Abyssinians bombarded the city and the Mahadists defended the city and heavy dust rose and covered the horizon for five hours and victory loomed for the Mahadists [68].

Johanna found out that his tribe Amhara was fighting with courage while a tribe from the Tigre was weak in performance, so he moved forward to rally his forces to fight, and he was carried in a chair wearing emperor clothes surrounded with his followers and that’s when the Ansar directed their weapons toward this crowd, and Mohammed Sa’eed Elgaddal thinks that the Ansar didn’t know that this huge crowd was surrounding king Johanna, and one of the bullets penetrated his hand and hit him a deadly hit that’s when the emperor asked his son to retreat to inside Abyssinia and that bullet ensured victory for the Ansar [69].

After the death of Johanna the troops of Ezzaky Tamal chased the Abyssinians until they reached Atbara river and he was able to kill many of them and to prison many more and he told Caliph Abdalla that [70].

The spoils of the Ansar from Gallabat:

The Ansar got so many gold from the Abyssinian after the battle of Elgallabat of which a hat from pure gold and many golden crosses and a silver bracelet and a huge number of weapons where the Ansar got 1186 firearm of which a Remington and Abu Lafta cannon and Khashkhashan and a huge amount of ammunition [71].

The Ansar were able to get the body of king Johanna and they cut his head and sent it to Caliph Abdalla in Omdurman with a big number of his commanders whom they imprisoned, the Ansar also lost 2600 fighter in this battle [72].

In the battle of Elgallabat, Victory was in the side of the Abyssinians in the beginning of the battle but the insistence of the Ansar to defend their city and attacking the crowd of king Johanna led them to achieve victory and killing king Johanna which broke the Abyssinian army, this victory led king Abdalla to think about attacking Egypt afterwards.

The battles of prince Othman Digna in eastern Sudan:

Eastern Sudan was an important point to the Mahdist revolution and that after Othman Digna joined the Imam Elmahdy in Elubayed and he named him the prince of the east and sent him to Eastern Sudan to work on the dissemination of Mahdia in those regions and from Elubayed Prince Othman went to the tribes of Elbushareen and Elamarar and invited them to  Mahdism, many of them responded and joined the resistance movement in east Sudan, marking the beginning of the Mahdist revolution in the east [73].

Elmagzobyea community contributed to strengthening the spirit of resistance in Prince Osman Digna added giving him a strong impetus to continue the revolution in the east of Sudan. It can be said that the meeting of the Imam Elmahdy with Prince Osman state Digna in Elubayed where each one of them completed the other, Osman the man of principles and who was angry at the Turks who was looking for revenge for himself and his tribe and the Imam was searching to spread Mahadism in all Sudan and that’s how the vision of the two men was united, Osman was the right man to command Mahadism in the east and that’s because he knew eastern Sudan and its tribes and prince Osman exploited the cover of Elmagzobya very well.

The combat style of Prince Osman Digna:

It is noteworthy that the combat method used by Prince Osman Digna was changing from one battle to another and is similar to the method of Imam Elmahdy combat where it is included from the attack to the siege, and the Battle of Okak (Senkat) was the first battle where Othman Digna used the style of attack and it can be described as a suicide attack, then the battles succeeded in the east such as Qebaba battle where Osman used the style of guerella battles which is a style used by the prince to hit the fortifications of the cities in eastern Sudan, Okak (Senkat), then the first battle of the shore (Atteeb) the first, and the second battle of the shore (Atteeb) the second), the battle of Kassala, the battle of Atbara, the Battle of Tamanaib, the English battle of Tamaneeb, and the Battle of Mahmoud Ali (Tahsheem) [74].

The first battle of shore is known as (Ateeb) and it’s a distortion to the word (Andebteeb) and this battle happened after prince Osman decided to attack Senkat (Okak) [75].

Where prince Osman sent Elkheder Ali Elkheder to besiege Tokar so Sulaiman Nyazy the administrator of the east decided to send a campaign under the leadership of Mahmoud Pasha to dismantle the siege, and the campaign was accompanied with the consul of Briton in Sawaken Monkareef and when the campaign moved forward from (trenktat) toward Tokar, the troops of of Osman attacked it so some of them escaped through the sea to Sawaken and huge number of its soldiers were killed as well as (Monkaref) the French consul and in December 1883 Osman was able to exterminate another campaign that was on its way to Senkat [76].

The number of the campaign troops was 550 soldier and after the death of Monkaref and the escape of Mahmoud Pasha the moral of the army increased and Mahmoud was impeached after this battle [77].

 

The second battle of the shore (Ateeb) the second 1301/ 4 November 1884:

Osman thought about besieging the city of Sawaken and to achieve that he sent Mustafa Ali Hadal in order to rally the tribes around Kassala then to siege it, then Osman was able to cut the commercial road between Sawaken and bereber which the reinforcement to Khartoum were sent through, so it became so dangerous for Briton and so Kassala doesn’t fall in the hand of Osman Digna the British authorities decided a campaign under the leadership of Becker the brother of Samuel Becker composed of 3600 of Ganderma and they are police force that was composed after the layoff of Uraby’s army [78].

In his book Sudan and the Mahdist Revolution, Makki Shbika points out that the mission of this campaign was a police mission focused on maintaining security, but Baker worked to prepare it militarily. Its task was to protect the trade route between Suakin-Berber, which was under the control of Osman Digna's forces. but in 9 January orders came to abandon the opening of the trade route and to save both Sankat and Tokar, but despite these tasks, the morale of his forces were in the bottom and has been clear from the moment they left Cairo, at the same time they were not motivated to fight.[79]

  Becker had chosen to save Sankat and Toker, who were at their worst because they was starving. Toker was short of ammunition. Becker was chosen to save Tokar because of the difficulty of rescuing Sankat. His forces moved towards Ateeb and found Osman Digna's forces .his forces formed In the form of a box, a combat style defined by the English, then the forces of Prince Osman Digna attacked the square, which led to the escape of the troops of Cairo and Alexandria, and turned on the square and provided the English-Egyptian forces from the square and abandoned their weapons and eliminated many of the soldiers of the campaign.[80]

Two thousand soldiers were killed. Baker fled with his forces to Swakin. The situation in Sankat deteriorated and the arrival of the rescuers failed. The commander decided to leave with all of them. A mile from the city they were destroyed and Othman Digna managed to control Senkat. In February, Tokar surrendered.[81]

Osman Digna earned from the second battle of Ateeb 6 cannons and 3000 rifles and 5000 pieces of ammunition and is one of the most important battles of Prince Osman Digna in eastern Sudan.[82]

The fall of Sankat, Tokar and Baker's defeat contributed to unrest in Swakin. After British interests in eastern Sudan became threatened, Britain abandoned its guard and decided to send three teams led by General Graham to Swakin. The main purpose of this campaign was to relieve pressure on Swakin and show Britain's strength. Girham moved from Trenktate and managed to defeat Prince Osman Digna and managed to occupy Tokar but was quickly evacuated and retreated to Swakin. The reason for this rapid decline was that Britain did not want its forces to remain outside Suakin and could not keep this distant city. In spite of the defeats suffered by Othman Digna, he remained in possession of the ability of the movement and remained a danger to Swakin and turned to the style of guerrilla warfare and was able to inflict many losses in the English-Egyptian forces and succeeded in isolating Khartoum from eastern Sudan[83].

Battle of Toshky 3 August 1889:

Imam Mahdi's plan was according to what he promised that he would open Egypt so the dream stopped a little after his death and when the Caliph Abdullah took power, he worked to implement the Mahdi plan and therefore sought to enforce the army of Najoumi prepared for this task, the army initially moved from Omdurman to the north As directed by the Caliph.

At the beginning of the year 1303 AH / 1886 AD, the Caliph Abdullah sent Prince Abdulrahman Al-Najoumi to Berber to move to Dongola and all the forces of the Red Banner. He arrived in Dongola in late 1303 AH / 1886 AD and took a camp for his troops and sent the Pioneers to the south of Halfa.[84]

The number of forces that moved towards Berber under the leadership of Najumi estimated at 70 thousand, and when they arrived in Berber dispersed many of these forces across the country and left only about twenty thousand fighters, including ten thousand of the jihadists who rebelled against him, but discovered this rebellion and was able to eliminate This rebellion, and after he arrived in Dongola, the Caliph Abdullah appointed an Mosaed who was supported by a number of fighters in order to be an agent of Abdul Rahman al-Najumi.[85]

There was a clear aversion between Najoumi and Mosaed Kiddum until he reached the stage that each of them is reviewing his army alone. In 1305 AH / 1888 the Caliph called Prince Abdulrahman Al-Najoumi to Omdurman and reprimanded him and humiliated him before the people. He reminded him that he was an unruly person and not fit for leadership. At the end of AH 1305 AH / 1888 AD, Nujoomi returned to Dongola for the purpose of advancing towards Egypt. By the year 1306 AH / 1889, famine spread throughout Sudan. The Caliph Abdullah appointed Yunus al-Dikim as the General Commander of Dongola and ordered him to pressure Najumi to move to Egypt.[86]

Younis al-Dikim was transferred from Elgallabat to Dongola. His transfer was after a dispute between him and Hamdan Abu Anja. The reason for this dispute is that Yunus al-Dikim took over the authorities of Hamdan Abu Anja in the Elgallabat and the caliph Abdullah became sure that they did not continue together in Algallabat and that’s why Younis al-Dakim was appointed as the commander on the entire army in Dongola.[87]

The Caliph Abdullah was encouraged to pressure Najoumi to move to Egypt because a number of tribes in southern Egypt had agreed to stand with the forces of the Caliph Abdullah against the Egyptian forces, including the tribe of Ja'afra , and despite the sickness of Najoumi he moved by his army, which fled a large number of it from Dongola To the north and gave a small amount of corn for each fighter, which is not enough to feed his troops.[88]

joined Najumi in Dongola 2,087 fighters from the tribe of Al-Batahin. Najoumi received them with a large display outside the city. Najumi gave a comprehensive account to the caliph in the numbers that joined him and their weapons and banners[89].

The strength of the Nujoomi forces consisted of the forces of the Red Brigades, as well as the tribal forces that joined the Najoumi, such as Robatab, Ja'aleen, Shaigia, Shukria, Danakla, Mahas, Rizeigat, habania and Misseriya. Their weapons were primitive compared to the Egyptian forces. The same weapon they fought with in the first Mahdia years[90].

The number of troops with Najoumi in Dongola before moving north was composed of 11977 fighters and the number of horses 840, while the white weapon was 2841 weapons, these numbers were in the 7th of Rabbie' Elawal 1306 AH / November 1889.[91]

 

The escape of the forces of Najoumi:

There have been cases of escape amid the army of Najoumi and the people of Dongola, and began the escape of Jihadists when Najumi moved from Dongola to Kersko, and the jihadists who worked on the cannons escaped and joined the Egyptian army, 32 jihadists escaped  also fled the head of Tobjyea Bakhit Jamoos, which led Ennogoumy lose a number of his important troops and what made things even worse was the escape of the Jihadist who were carrying the cannons and the camels died which led him to assign some supporters to take the guns for a long distance and then bury them so as not to fall into the hands of the English and Egyptian forces.[92]

The escape cases included the residents of Dongola, where a number of them fled to the Egyptian forces and joined them. They took advantage of the boats. A directive from Muhammad Khalid to Hamouda Idris, head of the Dulko point, stated that no vessel was allowed to pass unless it had a permit to pass through. [93]

the dispute between Najoumi and Mosaed Qidum and Yunis Eddekim:

The disputes rose between the leaders of the Mahdist state in ther northern front, and the most prominent of these disputes, which reflected negatively on the performance of Mahdia forces, the renewed dispute between Najumi and Mosae'd Kiddum, and this conflict made the caliph Abdullah play  a decisive role in resolving it, Qidum ask the Caliph Abdullah permission to come to Omdurman and clarify his point of view, and turn the conflict into another conflict between Yunus al-Dikim and Mosaed Kiddum.

The dispute between Najoumi and Moase'd was an administrative rather than a tribal struggle, which indicates that Kaidoum had entered into another conflict with Yunus al-Dikim. The conflict between Najoumi and Qidum was due to administrative, organizational and other non-tribal reasons. which weakened the strength of the army.[94]

Despite the apparent disagreement between Najoumi and the Qidum, Caliph Abdullah succeeded in reconciling them. After this reconciliation, the Caliph asked Najoumi to deport Mosa'ed's family from Surs to Dongola, to be ordered to deport them to a number of his followers[95].

Organization of the army of Najoumi in the north:

There were many directives issued by the Caliph Abdullah to Najoumi regarding the army with him. He was asked to organize his army and divide it into four large banners, to explain the numbers of the army and the numbers of the quarters and their weapons, and to appoint the people capable of management and leadership such as Mosae'ed Kiddoum and Abdel Halim Mosae'd and Mohammed Hamza, as leaders of the quarter and to review the army in the form of a row instead of quadratures, and the purpose of the method of row to introduce fear in the hearts of enemies.[96]

En-Najumi divided his army into four sections, are as follows:

The first section under the leadership of Najoumi 7400

Section II under the leadership of Ismail Haraka 2000

Section III under the leadership of Abdel Halim Mosaed 2200

Section IV under the leadership of a Mosaed Gaidoum 1200

 Total (12800) [97]

The forces of Najoumi in Sars under the leadership of Abdul Halim Musaed suffer from hunger, and exhaustion, which prompted Prince Abdul Halim Mosaed to write to Prince Abdul Rahman Al-Najumi asking him to send food and clothing, but at the same time the forces of Najumi suffer so much Najumi raised the request for support to the Caliph Abdullah.[98]

Hunger directly contributed to the escape of a number of his troops into Egyptian territory, which made Najoumi sad because he did not believe that any of his forces will join the camp of enemies[99].

As a result of the hunger situation, Abdel Halim Mousaed asked Mosaed Gaidoum to allow him to enter Egypt and work to bring food from there. However, his request was rejected and this refusal was issued by the Caliph Abdullah. And Mosaed stated to Abdel Halim Mousaed that the Egyptian forces did not enter Sudanese territory They cannot be attacked or entered their land[100].

Correspondence exchanged between Najoumi and the Egyptian army Serdar:

There were a number of letters sent by Egyptian army Sardar Granphil to Abdul Rahman Al-Najumi, and when the Caliph Abdullah learned of these letters asked Najomi not to respond to those messages because all the letters received from the Granphil only contain fraud and deception, and that prevention comes from the way of filing the gaps, and reminded him of the writings of Granphil to Osman Digna when he was in Kassala, where Osman Digna declined to respond, which led to the cut  of those letters with Osman Dignah.[101]

The caliph had a long view of the messages that come to Najoumi from the Egyptian army sardar. The Caliph Abdullah read the events well. He feared from the writings of Sardar of the Egyptian army on the cohesion of Najoumi, and that Granphil invests the shortage of food, weapons and ammunition in the pressure on Najumi and drives him to extradition, and the fear of the Caliph Abdullah of that we find prevented Najumi from responding to those messages.

Mediation of Mohammed Ser al-Khatim between Najoumi and the Egyptian government:

Muhammad al-Khatim al-Mirghani tried to mediate between al-Najoumi and the Egyptian government. He told Nujumi that he would raise his demands to the Egyptian government and stop the war between al-Najumi and the Egyptian government. He would try to convince the Egyptian government not to advance southward in Sudanese territory.[102]

There were a number of attempts by Sardar of the Egyptian army (Granphil) in which Najoumi called for extradition, and some of these speeches carried threats from (Granphil) to Najumi.[103]

The progression of Abdulrahman Ennogoumy’s forces towards the Egyptian lands:

The mediation of Mohammed Ser Elkhatem Elmarghny didn’t succeed, and Granphil couldn’t convince Ennougoumy to surrender, and the forces moved tired until it reached Samna where their number reached 4000 fighter and children and women 7000 while the army under the leadership of Abdulhaleem Mosaed 1200 fighters and women and children 1000.[104]

died of princes in Arqin 6 as for the losses in the battle that took place in Toshka, Najoumi lost 1200 dead and 4000 prisoners. Al-Najoumi was killed in this battle. After his death, his companions tried to carry him on camels and enter him into Sudanese territory. but the Egyptian were able take over the body of the heroic prince, which was found with it the son of Abdel Rahman Najomi, Abdullah, who survived the battle.[105]

Despite the defeat suffered by Prince Abdulrahman Al-Najumi and his forces in Toshki, but it has had a great impact in the hearts of Egyptians and has instilled fear in them through the incursion of these forces in their country for a distance of 60 miles, and Egypt was following the campaign and its incursion to the north has returned joy to the Egyptians after the elimination of the campaign in Toshki [106].

Battle of Kerry:

    The Battle of Karri and Al-Nakheela is one of the worst battles of Mahdia. This is due to a number of reasons. In Atbara or Nekhaila, Prince Mahmoud Wad Ahmed rejected the advice of Prince Osman Digna about the attack on the Hicks forces. Osman Digna suggested that the Ansar forces should move away from the Nile, and turn around on the Hicks forces from the rear and attack them in Berber or in his garrison at the Atbara River, but the young prince did not respond to the proposal of Osman Digna, although it was more appropriate to win the battle according to the data of that time. Mahmoud Wahd Ahmed's army moved to Nakheela and worked on building a large corral. He was waiting for an attack on him and he had what he wanted. On 8 April 1898, the Mahdia forces were defeated, despite the bravery of the Ansar in that battle[107].

  After this battle Osman Digna retreated to Omdurman, and Kitchener spent four months after the Battle of Nekhaila preparing his army and then heading to Omdurman to eliminate the Mahdist state and end the reign of Caliph Abdullah.[108]

 Kitchener completed his preparations for the final march towards Omdurman, where a number of new guns arrived at his camp and more British and Egyptian troops arrived. His forces numbered 25,800 men, one-third of whom were British. And the Caliph in Omdurman was preparing to confront Hicks, where started preparing for the confrontation of Hicks where he worked on fortifying the dam of Sapaloga north of Omdurman and began to prepare his forces from all the flags and tribes and also sent two vessels to bring grain from the areas of South White Nile [109].

     The Caliph Abdullah was unable to take advantage of the circumstances surrounding him, and this was made clear when he withdrew his forces from Sabloga on the grounds that he was unable to provide these forces with food away from Omdurman, thus Hicks found the road paved to the capital of the Mahdia state. On September 1, 1898, the Hicks forces arrived at the town of Al-Ajijah on the western side of the Nile. On the eastern side, forces of the Ja'aleen supported the campaign, and with the help of the vessels, they seized a position facing the capital Omdurman. The guns were set to hit the capital and the dome of the Mahdi was under the fire of the invasion[110].

 After Kitchener’s arrival at the site of Mount Karri, the Caliph was waiting for his enemies. Kitchener believed that the Caliph would attack him at night. Therefore, Kitchener sent his spies to the center of Ansar to attack them at night. The Caliph's decision was to attack the enemy army at morning.[111]

  All the flags were gathered in Karary, including the red flag after the caliph Abdullah released the Caliph Muhammad Sharif Hamed as the blue flag represented an army on its own and the army took the form of the parade[112].

  The forces of the Caliph Abdulla joined forces with the Anglo-Egyptian invasion on September 2, 1898, and a fierce battle took place between the two groups. The modern cannons managed to harvest thousands of Sudanese in a few hours and the partisans fought valiantly. but due to the high losses, Caliph Abdalla decided to retreat towards the west in order to organize his forces then to confront Hicks [113].

 The battle of Omdurman ended after five hours of fighting during which Mahdia forces were eliminated and the Hicks forces achieved many gains, most notably the entry of the capital Omdurman[114].

It was then the battle that broke the back of the Mahdia and due to the lack of good appreciation of the Caliph Abdulla Mahdia forces suffered a crushing defeat led to the end of the it to the end of the state of Mahdia, which began in 1881 and continued until 1898. With the defeat of Mahdia in Karari, the country that the Imam al-Mahdi and the successor Abdullah struggled to consolidate, ended

***

Conclusion

 

The fighting forces in the revolution and the Mahdist state represented the backbone of this revolution and then the state, where it undertook many tasks and made a lot of sacrifices. It used to fight directly and confront the enemy. It also played the role of surveying and reporting to Imam Mahdi about the battles and enemy forces. The Imam al-Mahdi became aware of the important and sensitive role played by the combat forces so as to raise their morale and train them regularly, as well as organizing them in groups and teams (Ras al-Mayah) and (Ras Eleshreen) also appeared the term of Mogaddam, prince and the governor, and behind all that was the Mahdi aspires to form combat forces capable of performing all tasks accurately and quickly.

After the death of Imam Mahdi, the Caliph Abdullah faced the problem of organizing these forces. Despite the existence of banners that were organized by the Imam Mahdi, we find that the Caliph Abd Allah gradually merged them into the blue flag. Later, internal divisions and tribal problems emerged. This had a negative effect on the Mahdist state and hastened the defeats of the Mahdist state. represented in Toshki, Karri and the Om  Debikrat. It can be said that despite the negatives that accompanied the period of Mahdia in Sudan, but it clearly demonstrated the ability of the Sudanese fighter to be patient and implement military plans to the fullest, and this was explained in the first Mahdi battles until the liberation of Khartoum and the battles of Prince Osman Digna and the battle of Elgallabat.

Sources and references

First: Sources:

documents :

1 - Mahdia 1 / 10A / 2 from the Caliph Abdullah to Muhammad Khalid Zaql, 8 Safar 1302 AH, November 1884, p. 200.

2 - Mahdia 1 / 10A / 2 from the Caliph Abdullah to Muhammad Khalid Zaql, 20 Safar 1302 AH, November 1884, p. 202.

3 - Mahdia 1 / 10A / 2 from the Caliph Abdullah to Muhammad Khalid Zqul, 22 Safar 1302 AH, November 1884, p. 206.

4 - Mahdia 1 / 10A / 2 of the Caliph Abdullah to Muhammad Khalid Zqul, 28 Rabi 'I 1301 AH, December 1883, p.

5- D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/68/2 from Caliph Abdullah to Hamdan Abu Anja, 25 Jumad I 1306 AH, January 1889, p. 272.

6- D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1 from Abdul Rahman Al-Najoumi to the Caliph Abdullah, 8 Rabie Awal 1306 AH, November 1888, p.

7- D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1 from Abdul Rahman Al-Najoumi to the Caliph Abdullah, 7 Rabea Awal 1306 AH, November 1888, p. 85.

8- D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1 from Abdul Rahman Al-Najoumi to the Caliph Abdullah, Al-Qadah 1306 AH, August 1889, p. 103.

9- D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/37/2 From Muhammad Wad Bishara to Hamouda Idris, 16 Shawwal 1313 AH, March 1896, p. 17.

10. D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1 from Abdul Rahman Al-Najoumi to the Caliph Abdullah, the first Rabee’ 1306 AH, November 1888, p. 92.

11- D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1/3 from Abdul Rahman Al-Najoumi to Yunus al-Dikim, 29 November 1306 AH, July 1889, p. 32.

12- D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1/3 from Abdel Halim Mousaed to Halim Mousaad, 24 Ramadan 1305 AH, May 1888, p. 67.

13- D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1/3 from the Caliph Abdullah to Abdul Rahman Al-Najoumi, 15 Al-Hajjaj 1306 AH, April 1889, p. 53.

 

Documents and books:

Joseph Orvald, ten years in captivity at the Mahdi Camp, (1882-1892), (translation) Awad Ahmed Mohamed El-Dow, Khartoum Printing Press, Khartoum, 2008.

2. Winston Churchill, History of the Mahdist Revolution and the British occupation of Sudan, (translation) Ezzedine Mahmoud, Dar Al-Shorouq, Cairo, 2006.

3 - Ibrahim Fawzi, Sudan in the hands of Gordon and Kitchener, C1, the Library of Documentary Books, Cairo, 2008.

4 - Youssef Mikhael, Turkish and Mahdia and bilateral rule, eyewitness, (investigation), Ahmed Ibrahim Abu Hush, Abdul Karim Merghani Center, Omdurman 2004.

5. Ismail Abdul Qadir al-Har Dafani, The Sudanese Abyssinian War, (1885-1888), (The Style Engraved by John the King of Habush), (investigation) Muhammad Ibrahim Abu-Salem, Muhammad Saeed Al-Qadal, Dar Al-Jail, Beirut, 1991.

6- Naum Choucair, Geography and History of Sudan, Dar Azza for Printing and Publishing, Khartoum, 2007.

7 - Othman Dokneh, (investigation) Mohammed Ibrahim Abu Salim Dar Jil, Beirut, 1991.

8. Ar-Wonget, Mahdia and the Egyptian Sudan, (translated) Mohammed Mustafa Hassan, Dar Azza for printing and publishing, Khartoum, 2009.

9- Editorials of Abdulrahman Al-Najoumi, Mohammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, Publications of Abu Salim Center, Khartoum, 2004.

10- Winston Churchill, History of the Mahdist Revolution and the British occupation of Sudan '(translated) Ezzeddine Mahmoud, Dar Al-Shorouk Cairo, 2006, 286

Second: Arabic References:

1- Mohammed Saeed Al-Qaddal, Modern History of Sudan, (1820-1956), 2, Dar Al-Mushaaf Africa, Khartoum, 2002.

2- Imam Al-Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad bin Abdullah, (1844-1885), Dar Al-Jeel Beirut, 1992.

Mahdiya and Habishah, Studies in the Internal and External Policy of the Mahdia State (1881-1898), Dar al-Jail, Beirut, 1992

4- Abdul-Mahmud Abu Shama, From Aba to Taslha The Life Wars of Imam Mahdi, Military Printing Press, Omdurman, 1987.

5. Muhammad Mahjoub Malik, Internal Resistance of the Mahdia Movement, (1881-1898), Dar Al-Jil, Beirut, 1986.

6. Ismat Hassan Zulfu, Shikan, Military Analysis of the Campaign of General Hicks, I 2, Karri Press and Publishing, Former Military Press, Omdurman, 1984.

7, Reiki, Military Analysis of the Battle of Omdurman, Tahadi Press, Khartoum, 1981

8- Sulaiman Kasha, Establishment of Khartoum City and Mahdia, (BD), (B).

9- Dharrar Saleh Darrar, Modern History of Sudan, I4, Al-Hayat Publications, Beirut, 1968.

10-Makki Shabika, Sudan and the Mahdia Revolution (from Aba's position to the siege of Khartoum), C2, University of Khartoum House, 1984.

11 -__________, History of the Nile Valley peoples (Egypt and Sudan) in the 19th century, Dar al-Thaqafa, Beirut, 1980.

12- Khartoum, Between the Mahdi and Gordon, Publications of the Extra Study Committee, University of Khartoum, 1986.

13 - Abdul Wadood Shalabi, the intellectual assets of the Mahdia Movement, the Sudanese Mahdi and his call, Literary Library, Cairo, 2001.

      14. Mohamed Fouad Shoukry, Egypt and Sudan, History of the Nile Valley Political Unit in the Nineteenth Century (1820-1899), Dar Al Ma'arif, Cairo, 1963.

     15- Hatem Al-Siddiq Mohamed Ahmed, The Role of Prince Yaqoub in the Mahdi, The Arab House of Encyclopedias, Beirut, 2009.

16 - Abdel Wahab Ahmed Abdel Wahab, Toshka, a historical study of the campaign of Abdul Rahman Najoumi on Egypt, Khartoum University Publishing House, 1979.

17-Ali Mohamed Barakat, British Politics and the Restoration of the Sudan, (1889-1899), Egyptian Printing Press, The Arab Library, Cairo, 1977, p. 43.

18- Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim, History of the Modern Sudan, (1821-1956), Dara Publishing, Khartoum, 1987.

19- Drar Saleh Dharar, Modern History of Sudan, No. 4, Al-Hayat Library, Beirut, 1968.

20- Azzam Abu Bakr Ali al-Tayeb, Relations between the Caliph Abdullah al-Taaweesh and the tribes of Sudan (1885-1898), National Authority for Culture and Arts, Khartoum, 1992.

Foreign References:

1. Robert Okulins, Modern History of Sudan, (investigation) Mustafa Majdi Al-Jamal, National Center for Translation, Dar Al-Ain Publishing, Alexandria, 2010.

2 - Fergus Nicole, Saif al-Nabi Mahdi Sudan, (translated) Abdul Wahed Abdullah Yousif, Publisher, Abdulkarim Mergani Center, Khartoum, 2009.

3. B. M. Holt, Mahdia in Sudan, translation, Jamil Obaid, Dar Al-Fikr Al-Arabi, Beirut 1982

4. Robin Neland, Al-Mahadia Wars, translated Abdalgadir Abdalrahman, Al-Wehda Printing, Abu Dhabi 2002.

 

 


[1] Robert Okulins, Modern History of Sudan, (investigation) Mustafa Majdi Al-Jamal, National Center for Translation, Dar Al-Ain Publishing, Alexandria, 2010.

 

[2] Joseph Orvald, ten years in captivity at the Mahdi Camp, (1882-1892), (translation) Awad Ahmed Mohamed El-Dow, Khartoum Printing Press, Khartoum, 2008.

 

[3] - Mohammed Saeed Al-Qaddal, Modern History of Sudan, (1820-1956), 2, Dar Al-Mushaaf Africa, Khartoum, 2002.

[4] - Abdul-Mahmud Abu Shama, From Aba to Taslha The Life Wars of Imam Mahdi, Military Printing Press, Omdurman, 1987.

 

[5] Fergus Nicole, Saif al-Nabi Mahdi Sudan, (translated) Abdul Wahed Abdullah Yousif, Publisher, Abdulkarim Mergani Center, Khartoum, 2009.

[6] Abdul Mahmoud Abu shama: Ibid

[7] Fegus Nicole: Ibid

[8] Abdul Mahmoud Abu Shama: Ibid

[9] Mohammed Saeed Elgaddal: Imam Elmahdy

[10] Muhammad Mahjoub Malik, Internal Resistance of the Mahdia Movement, (1881-1898), Dar Al-Jil, Beirut, 1986.

[11] . Ismat Hassan Zulfu, Shikan, Military Analysis of the Campaign of General Hicks, I 2, Karri Press and Publishing, Former Military Press, Omdurman, 1984.

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid

[14] Mohammed Saeed Elgaddal: Ibid

[15] - Winston Churchill, History of the Mahdist Revolution and the British occupation of Sudan '(translated) Ezzeddine Mahmoud, Dar Al-Shorouk Cairo, 2006, 286

[16] Fergus Nicole: ibid

[17] Mohammed Saeed Al-Qaddal, Modern History of Sudan: ibid

[18] Ibrahim Fawzi, Sudan in the hands of Gordon and Kitchener, C1, the Library of Documentary Books, Cairo, 2008.

[19] Mohammed Saeed Al-Qaddal, Modern History of Sudan: ibid

[20] Abdul-Mahmud Abu Shama: ibid

[21] M. Holt, Mahdia in Sudan, translation, Jamil Obaid,

[22] Sulaiman Kasha, Establishment of Khartoum City and Mahdia, (BD), (B).

[23] Mohammed Saeed Al-Qaddal, Modern History of Sudan: ibid

[24] Drar Saleh Dharar, Modern History of Sudan, No. 4, Al-Hayat Library, Beirut, 1968.

[25] Muhammad Mahjoub Malik: ibid

[26] - Mohammed Saeed Al-Qaddal: ibid

[27] ibid

Muhammad Mahjoub Malik: ibid [28]

[29] B. M. Holt: ibid

[30] ibid

[31] B. M. Holt: ibid

[32] - Youssef Mikhael, Turkish and Mahdia and bilateral rule, eyewitness, (investigation), Ahmed Ibrahim Abu Hush, Abdul Karim Merghani Center, Omdurman 2004.

 

[33] - Youssef Mikhael: ibid

[34] Mohammed Saeed Al-Qaddal : ibid

[35] . Ismat Hassan Zulfu: ibid

[36] Mohammed Saeed Al-Qaddal : ibid

[37] Makki Shabika, Sudan and the Mahdia Revolution (from Aba's position to the siege of Khartoum), C2, University of Khartoum House, 1984.

 

[38] Makki Shabika, Sudan and the Mahdia Revolution: ibid

[39] Mohammed Saeed Elgaddal , Imam Mohammed Ahmed Elmahdy : ibid

[40] Muhammad Mahjoub Malik: ibid

[41] Abdul-Mahmud Abu Shama : ibid

[42] dul-Mahmud Abu Shama : ibid

[43] - Ibrahim Fawzi: ibid

[44] B. M. Holt : ibid

[45] B. M. Holt : ibid

[46] Shepaika, History of the Nile Valley peoples (Egypt and Sudan) in the 19th century, Dar al-Thaqafa, Beirut, 1980.

[47] ibid

[48] Muhammad Ibrahim

[49] - Abdul Wadood Shalabi, the intellectual assets of the Mahdia Movement, the Sudanese Mahdi and his call, Literary Library, Cairo, 2001.

[50] Naum Choucair, Geography and History of Sudan, Dar Azza for Printing and Publishing, Khartoum, 2007

[51] Muhammad Mahjoub Malik: ibid

[52] . Mohamed Fouad Shoukry, Egypt and Sudan, History of the Nile Valley Political Unit in the Nineteenth Century (1820-1899), Dar Al Ma'arif, Cairo, 1963.

[53] Makkey Shepaika : Khartoum between Elmahdy and Gordon

[54] Mahdia 1 / 10A / 2 from the Caliph Abdullah to Muhammad Khalid Zaql, 8 Safar 1302 AH, November 1884, p. 200.

[55] Mahdia 1 / 10A / 2 from the Caliph Abdullah to Muhammad Khalid Zaql, 20 Safar 1302 AH, November 1884, p. 202.

[56] Mahdia 1 / 10A / 2 from the Caliph Abdullah to Muhammad Khalid Zqul, 22 Safar 1302 AH, November 1884, p. 206.

[57] Mahdia 1 / 10A / 2 of the Caliph Abdullah to Muhammad Khalid Zqul, 28 Rabi 'I 1301 AH, December 1883, p.

 

[58] B. M. Holt : ibid

[59] Deresa is iron pieces that are collected together with sharp edges, Gordon Pasha used it to defend Khartoum where he planted them in the mud to prevent the Ansar from entering the city.

[60] ibid

[61] ibid

[62] B. M . Holt : ibid

[63] Mohammed Saeed Al-Qaddal, Modern History of Sudan

[64] Naum Choucair, Geography and History of Sudan: ibid

[65] ibid

[66] ibid

[67] Ismail Abdul Qadir al-kurdofani, The Sudanese Abyssinian War, (1885-1888), (The Style Engraved by John the King of Habush), (investigation) Muhammad Ibrahim Abu-Salem, Muhammad Saeed Al-Qadal, Dar Al-Jail, Beirut, 1991

[68] ibid

[69] Mohammed Saeed Elgaddal: Mahadism and Abyssinia, a study

[70] Naum Choucair : ibid

[71] Naum Choucair : ibid

[72] Robin Nilland,the wars of Elmahdya

[73] Othman Dokneh, (investigation) Mohammed Ibrahim Abu Salim Dar Jil, Beirut, 1991.

 

[74] Othman Dokneh, (investigation) Mohammed Ibrahim Abu Salim Dar Jil, Beirut, 1991.

[75] ibid

[76] Mohammed Saeed Al-Qaddal, Modern History of Sudan: ibid

[77] Othman Dokneh : ibid

[78] Mohammed Saeed Al-Qaddal, Modern History of Sudan: ibid

[79] Makki Shabika, Sudan and the Mahdia Revolution

ibid[80]

Mohammed Saeed Al-Qaddal, Modern History of Sudan : ibid[81]

Othman Dokneh  : ibid[82]

[83] Mohammed Saeed Al-Qaddal, Modern History of Sudan

[84] - Ibrahim Fawzi, Sudan: ibid

[85] ibid

[86] - Ibrahim Fawzi, Sudan

[87] - D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/68/2 from Caliph Abdullah to Hamdan Abu Anja, 25 Jumad I 1306 AH, January 1889, p. 272.

[88] Ibrahim Fawzi : ibid

[89] D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1 from Abdul Rahman Al-Najoumi to the Caliph Abdullah, 8 Rabie Awal 1306 AH, November 1888,

[90] - Abdel Wahab Ahmed Abdel Wahab, Toshka, a historical study of the campaign of Abdul Rahman Najoumi on Egypt, Khartoum University Publishing House, 1979.

[91] - D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1 from Abdul Rahman Al-Najoumi to the Caliph Abdullah, 7 Rabea Awal 1306 AH, November 1888, p. 85.

[92] D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1 from Abdul Rahman Al-Najoumi to the Caliph Abdullah, Al-Qadah 1306 AH, August 1889, p. 103

[93] - D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/37/2 From Muhammad Wad Bishara to Hamouda Idris, 16 Shawwal 1313 AH, March 1896, p. 17.

[94] Abdel Wahab Ahmed Abdel Wahab : ibid

[95] D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1 from Abdul Rahman Al-Najoumi to the Caliph Abdullah : 14 Rajab March 1305

[96] D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1 from Abdul Rahman Al-Najoumi to the Caliph Abdullah : 24 Safar 1306 ocrober

[97] . F  . R Wonget, Mahdia and the Egyptian Sudan, (translated) Mohammed Mustafa Hassan, Dar Azza for printing and publishing, Khartoum, 2009

[98] D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1 from Abdul Rahman Al-Najoumi to the Caliph Abdullah, the first Rabee’ 1306 AH, November 1888, p. 92.

[99] D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1/3 from Abdul Rahman Al-Najoumi to Yunus al-Dikim, 29 November 1306 AH, July 1889, p. 32

[100] D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1/3 from Abdel Halim Mousaed to Halim Mousaad, 24 Ramadan 1305 AH, May 1888, p. 67.

[101] D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1/3 from the Caliph Abdullah to Abdul Rahman Al-Najoumi, 15 Al-Hajjaj 1306 AH, April 1889, p. 53.

[102] D. W. M. Kh, Madhiya 1/1 from Abdul Rahman Al-Najoumi to the Caliph Abdullah, 7 Rabea Akher 1306

[103] Editorials of Abdulrahman Al-Najoumi, Mohammad Ibrahim Abu Salim, Publications of Abu Salim Center, Khartoum, 2004

[104] Wenget : ibid

[105] Ali Mohamed Barakat, British Politics and the Restoration of the Sudan, (1889-1899), Egyptian Printing Press, The Arab Library, Cairo, 1977, p. 43.

[106] Wenget: ibid

[107] Mohammed Saeed Al-Qaddal, Modern History of Sudan : ibid

[108] Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim, History of the Modern Sudan, (1821-1956), Dara Publishing, Khartoum, 1987.

[109] B. M . Holt: ibid

[110] B. M. Holt : ibid

[111] Drar Saleh Dharar, Modern History of Sudan, No. 4, Al-Hayat Library, Beirut, 1968.

[112] Ismat Hassan Zulfu, Shikan, Military Analysis

[113] Azzam Abu Bakr Ali al-Tayeb, Relations between the Caliph Abdullah al-Taaweesh and the tribes of Sudan (1885-1898), National Authority for Culture and Arts, Khartoum, 1992.

[114] . Winston Churchill, History of the Mahdist Revolution and the British occupation of Sudan, (translation) Ezzedine Mahmoud, Dar Al-Shorouq, Cairo, 2006.

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